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1	* * * * * * *	rage 770
2	PUBLIC HEARING	
3	ON THE	
4	SAGO MINE DISASTER	
5	May 2, 2006 - May 4, 2006	
6	* * * * * *	
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8	May 4, 2006	
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10	* * * * * *	
11	West Virginia Wesleyan College	
12	Rockefeller Physical Education Center	
13	Buckhannon, West Virginia	
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18	REPORTER: Miranda D. Elkins	
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25	certifying agency.	

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2 3	DAVITT MCATEED		2	DENNIETT HATEIELD	
	DAVITT MCATEER,		3	BENNETT HATFIELD, President/CEO, ICG	
4 5	Chair BRIAN MILLS,		4 5	CECIL ROBERTS,	
6	Inspector at Large, WVMSHT		6	Family Representative	
7	MONTE HIEB,		7	ranning Representative	
8	Mining Engineer		8		
9	JOHN UROSEK,		9		
10	Ventilation Expert, MSHA		10		
11	DAN MEREDITH,		11		
12	Son-In-Law, James Bennett		12		
13	RAY MCKINNEY,		13		
14	Administrator, MSHA		14		
15	ED CLAIR,		15		
16	Associate Solicitor, MSHA		16		
17	CHRIS WEAVER,		17		
18	Presenter		18		
19	RUSSELL BENNETT,		19		
20	Son, Marty Bennett		20		
21	JAMES DEAN,		21		
22	Director, WVMHST		22		
23	DEBBIE HAMNER,		23		
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2		2	I think, Richard you're
3	CLOSING STATEMENTS	3	going to go first.
4	By Delegate Caputo 1228 - 1231	4	MR. GATES:
5	By Senator Caruth 1231 - 1233	5	Okay. Good. Mr.
6	By Delegate Frederick 1233 - 1234	6	Chairman, panel members, Sago families
7	By Delegate Hamilton 1234 - 1237	7	and other distinguished guests. My
8	By Mr. Hatfield 1238 - 1246	8	name is Richard Gates, and I am an MSHA
9	By Mr. Roberts 1246 - 1255	9	district manager in Birmingham,
10	By Mr. Dean 1255 - 1257	10	Alabama. I'm also the chief
11	By Mr. McKinney 1257 - 1260	11	investigator assigned to the Sago mine
12	By Chair 1260 - 1262	12	investigation. I'm a mining engineer,
13	CERTIFICATE 1263	13	originally from a small farming and
14	CERTIFICATE 1200	14	coal mining community in southern
15		15	Illinois, where I started my career.
16		16	I've worked in mine
17		17	safety matters for MSHA at field
18		18	locations throughout the United States,
19		19	as well as at MSHA's headquarters in
20		20	Arlington, Virginia. I have over 20
21		21	years of mine safety & health
22		22	experience.
23		23	As some of you know, the
24		24	Mine Safety & Health Administration is
25		25	a U.S. Department of Labor agency
			a cro. 2 spartment or 2000; agents
	Page 1002		Page 1004
1	Page 1002 PROCEEDINGS	1	charged by Congress to inspect mines,
2	P R O C E E D I N G S	2	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety
2	PROCEEDINGS CHAIR:	2	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety standards and to investigate mine
2 3 4	PROCEEDINGS CHAIR: I'd ask us to stand for a	2 3 4	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety standards and to investigate mine accidents, such as the explosion at the
2 3 4 5	PROCEEDINGS CHAIR: I'd ask us to stand for a moment of silence followed by a prayer	2 3 4 5	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety standards and to investigate mine accidents, such as the explosion at the Sago Mine.
2 3 4 5 6	PROCEEDINGS CHAIR: I'd ask us to stand for a moment of silence followed by a prayer and the pledge of allegiance.	2 3 4 5 6	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety standards and to investigate mine accidents, such as the explosion at the Sago Mine. Under that authority,
2 3 4 5 6 7	PROCEEDINGS CHAIR: I'd ask us to stand for a moment of silence followed by a prayer and the pledge of allegiance. MOMENT OF SILENCE	2 3 4 5 6 7	charged by Congress to inspect mines, promulgate and enforce mine safety standards and to investigate mine accidents, such as the explosion at the Sago Mine. Under that authority, MSHA conducts interviews, physical
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	Page 1005	_		ge 1007
1	the West Virginia Office of Miners'	1	mine safety instructor; John Scott,	
2	Health, Safety & Training, is doing	2	electrical inspector, mine rescue team	
3	everything we can to determine the root	3	member; John Hall, electrical	
4	cause of what happened and what might	4	inspector, mine rescue team member;	
5	prevent such a tragedy from happening	5	John Collins, district inspector; Jeff	
6	again.	6	Bennett, district inspector, mine	
7	We welcome the	7	rescue team member; Barry Fletcher,	
8	opportunity to tell you about our	8	roof control inspector, mine rescue	
9	investigation and our progress so far,	9	team member, and Robert True, Jr.,	
10	as well as our plans for the future.	10	district inspector.	
11	To accomplish this, we have prepared a	11	Additional West Virginia	
12	PowerPoint presentation for you.	12	Office of Miners' Health, Safety &	
13	As I mentioned, my name	13	Training personnel have been have	
14	is Richard Gates, and I am the accident	14	participated in the investigation, are	
15	team leader, a team of individuals,	15	Bennie Comer, electrical inspector;	
16	highly-trained individuals and	16	Phil Adkins, safety instructor; Jim	
17	specialists from throughout the United	17	Hodges, safety instructor, Region	
18	States was put together to investigate	18	Three; John Cruse, technical analyst,	
19	this accident. John Urosek, who is on	19	Region Four; Dave Stuart from the	
20	the panel here to my right. Clete	20	Attorney General's office, and James	
21	Stephan from the ventilation division	21	Dean, the acting director.	
22	and tech support. Richard Stoltz,	22	Mr. Rutledge's initial	
23	Dennis Swentosky, Joseph O'Donnell,	23	set assignment was to provide	
24	Gary Harris and Russell Dresch.	24	photographic support for the	
25	The team's also been	25	investigation team. He later was	
	Page 1006		Pag	ge 1008
1	Page 1006 assisted by the Office of the	1	Pag assigned to conduct the interviews of	ge 1008
1 2		1 2	_	ge 1008
	assisted by the Office of the		assigned to conduct the interviews of	ge 1008
2	assisted by the Office of the Solicitor, James Crawford, Tim Williams	2	assigned to conduct the interviews of persons called to testify. Mr. Hieb's primary responsibility is to provide technical	ge 1008
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2 3 4 5 6	assisted by the Office of the Solicitor, James Crawford, Tim Williams and Robert Wilson. The team's also been assisted by many other MSHA engineers and specialists from various districts	2 3 4 5 6	assigned to conduct the interviews of persons called to testify. Mr. Hieb's primary responsibility is to provide technical assistance throughout the investigative effort. To date, approximately 320	ge 1008
2 3 4 5 6 7	assisted by the Office of the Solicitor, James Crawford, Tim Williams and Robert Wilson. The team's also been assisted by many other MSHA engineers and specialists from various districts throughout the country and our	2 3 4 5 6 7	assigned to conduct the interviews of persons called to testify. Mr. Hieb's primary responsibility is to provide technical assistance throughout the investigative effort. To date, approximately 320 inspection shifts by the West Virginia	
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	D 1000		D 1011
1	Page 1009 the arrows are showing the locations in	1	Page 1011 subsequently ventilated, explored and
2	the mine where the miners were when the	2	examined before the teams, the accident
3	accident occurred and how they	3	investigation teams entered the mine.
4	where they were at when they exited the	4	In the time frame between
5	mine.	5	the event and between the underground
6	One miner was found near	6	portion of the investigation beginning,
7	the Two Left switch in direct line of	7	interviews of miners, mine rescue team
8	the forces and gases from the	8	members and officials began on January
9	explosion, and the 12 miners from the	9	17th, 2006. The last interview to date
10	Two Left crew did not exit but	10	
11	barricaded themselves near the face of	11	was completed on April 5th, 2006. The interview of Randal McCloy has not yet
		12	
12 13	the Number Three entry in the Two Left section.	13	been completed, and additionally there will be officials or some of the
		14	
14	The old Two Left main		consultants from ICG will also be
15	seals were installed to isolate the	15	interviewed in the future.
16	active area from the sealed area. This	16	To date 74 interviews of
17	was accomplished by the construction	17	70 individuals had occurred, and we
18	- or with the construction of ten Omega	18	continue to read and research through
19	block seals.	19	the several thousand pages of
20	Sealing is and has been a	20	transcripts. As some of you have had,
21	common practice in the mining industry.	21	there are a lot of you who have had
22	When mining is discontinued in an area	22	access to those to those documents.
23	of the mine, mine operators often	23	You've realized that there is, in
24	construct permanent seals to isolate	24	fact, some conflicting information
25	this area.	25	contained in the in the
	Page 1010		Page 1012
1	Page 1010 An explosive	1	Page 1012 transcripts, and the investigation team
1 2	-	1 2	_
	An explosive		transcripts, and the investigation team
2	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in	2	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information
2	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left	2	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've
2 3 4	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left section. And these seals were totally, totally destroyed from the forces of the explosion. And as you can see from	2 3 4	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've obtained from other sources to try to
2 3 4 5	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left section. And these seals were totally, totally destroyed from the forces of	2 3 4 5	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've obtained from other sources to try to determine what's accurate and what is
2 3 4 5 6	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left section. And these seals were totally, totally destroyed from the forces of the explosion. And as you can see from	2 3 4 5 6	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've obtained from other sources to try to determine what's accurate and what is not.
2 3 4 5 6 7	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left section. And these seals were totally, totally destroyed from the forces of the explosion. And as you can see from the arrow, the arrow's depicting the	2 3 4 5 6 7	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've obtained from other sources to try to determine what's accurate and what is not. Of the 74 or the 70
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	An explosive concentration of fuel was ignited in the sealed area inby the Two Left section. And these seals were totally, totally destroyed from the forces of the explosion. And as you can see from the arrow, the arrow's depicting the seals blown in an outward direction from within the sealed area. The investigation	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	transcripts, and the investigation team continues to compare that information to other information that we've obtained from other sources to try to determine what's accurate and what is not. Of the 74 or the 70 individuals who have been interviewed
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	Page 1013		Page 1015
1	in that area.	1	team continues to look at are the gas
2	The owner of an	2	detection equipment, including the
3	engineering firm responsible for	3	detection equipment, including the detectors that were carried by the
4	surveying and mapping, an electrical	4	miners in the mine at Sago, and also
5	contractor, and the four individuals	5	the atmospheric monitoring system that
6	who had the had the most knowledge	6	was in place along the belt line in the
7	and the most exposure to the seal	7	mine. The self-contained self-rescuers
8	building seal building in the old	8	that the miners carried, and the
9	Two Left were called back for	9	overall training that was provided to
10	additional information.	10	the miners at the mine.
11	We'll talk a little bit	11	As you've seen in some of
12	about a series of tests that we are	12	the earlier panel presentations, some
13		13	·
14	conducting with the in conjunction with NIOSH, at their Lake Lynn	14	layouts of the Sago Mine, and you have been told and have seen that it's
15	laboratory, and it involves	15	
16	construction of seals. And once we	16	approximately two miles from the portal of the mine into the sealed
17		17	where the seals were constructed.
18	started that process, we found that	18	
19	there was, in fact, some additional		And just a little bit farther than that, to the One Left section and the
20	information, or more questions that	19	·
	needed to be asked to try to determine	20 21	Two Left working section.
21	exactly how those seals were built.		Prior to the accident on
22	Some of the major issues	22	January 2nd, pre-shift examiners
23	that the accident investigation team	23	entered the mine to conduct their
24	continues to look at were and I	24 25	examination. At approximately 6:00
25	guess that's one thing I'd like to say	25	a.m., the One Left and Two Left crews
	Page 1014		Page 1016
1	Page 1014 now, is to emphasize and I'll	1	Page 1016 entered the mine. And what we have
2	_	1 2	entered the mine. And what we have here is a little video clip of an
	now, is to emphasize and I'll		entered the mine. And what we have
2	now, is to emphasize and I'll reiterate a time or two as we go through today, that the accident investigation is, in fact, ongoing. As	2	entered the mine. And what we have here is a little video clip of an actual mantrip that's used in the mine, it's a battery-powered mantrip that
2	now, is to emphasize and I'll reiterate a time or two as we go through today, that the accident	2	entered the mine. And what we have here is a little video clip of an actual mantrip that's used in the mine,
2 3 4	now, is to emphasize and I'll reiterate a time or two as we go through today, that the accident investigation is, in fact, ongoing. As	2 3 4	entered the mine. And what we have here is a little video clip of an actual mantrip that's used in the mine, it's a battery-powered mantrip that operates on rail. And we'll show it as it enters the mine, just to give the
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1			
	Page 1017	4	Page 1019
	mine.	1	the SCSRs that they were carrying with
2	At approximately 6:14	2	on their belt, others have not.
3	a.m. the First Left crew drops off John	3	The miners continue to
4	Boni at the One Right switch.	4	travel outby in a group. Again, you
5	At about 6:19 a.m. the	5	can see the timeline or the clock
6	One Left crew drops off Pat Boni near the Four belt head.	6 7	depicted on the lower left-hand corner
7			of the screen.
8	At approximately 6:26	8	At crosscut 27 the miners
9	a.m., the First Left crew arrives at	9	hear a mantrip that's coming in from
10	the section switch, which is a device	10	the portal, and at about 7:05 a.m. all
11	on the track that enables the mantrip	11	of the One Left crew, with the
12 13	to make the turn to go into the	12	exception of Misters Grall and Abington
	section.	13	hear the trip coming, and traveled
14 15	Flip the switch, and got	14	through a door at 27 crosscut into the
16	back in the mantrip. At approximately	15 16	track entry. Misters Wilfong, Boni and Hofer start to take the One Left crew
	6:26 an explosion occurred in the old		
17 18	Two Left seals, damaging all the seals as well as ventilation controls for	17 18	outside on the mantrip. Misters Toler
			and Schoonover, who were on the mantrip
19 20	approximately 1,000 feet in the Second Left and Two north mains.	19 20	coming into the mine, remained
21		21	underground to assess the situation.
22	Multiple lightning strikes also occurred near the mine	22	Mr. Grall and Abington waited at the Number Nine crosscut
23			
23	around this time. As you can see on the mine map, the ventilation controls	23 24	until the mantrip arrives and then exit the mine in the mantrip with the rest
25	that are damaged are depicted with	25	of the One Left crew.
23	that are damaged are depicted with	23	of the one Left clew.
	Page 1018		Page 1020
1	arrows showing the direction of the	1	The One Left crew with
2	forces that caused them to be damaged.		
	3	2	Mrs. Wilfong, John Boni and Hofer
3	After the explosion, at	2	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Mrs. Wilfong, John Boni and Hofer continued traveling outby, arriving at the surface at approximately 7:30 a.m.
3	After the explosion, at	3	Mrs. Wilfong, John Boni and Hofer continued traveling outby, arriving at
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1 2			
	Page 1021	1	Page 1023 second explosion occurring, and the
. ,	repairing the stoppings between the	1 2	problems that they were having trying
3	intake and belt as they travel inby. As you can see, depicted	3	to clear the smoke in that area. So
4	·	3 4	the decision was made to exit the mine.
5	with the single black line, as the	5	
6	miners are traveling inby repairing the	_	And at approximately 10:35 a.m.,
7	damaged ventilation controls.	6 7	Toler, Wilfong, Jones, Schoonover and Hofer exit the mine.
8	On the way inby at 49 crosscut, Toler crosses into the track	-	
9	entry and enters into the belt entry to	8 9	Just to give you an idea
10	retrieve the mine phone at the belt	10	of what we were talking about or what I
11	head. He observes a reading of	11	was talking about when we showed the
12	<u> </u>	12	miners going proceeding inby and
13	approximately 700 parts per million carbon monoxide in the track entry.	13	fixing or dressing the ventilation
14	Mr. Toler extends the	14	controls, what you can see in the upper left-hand corner are the permanent
15		15	stoppings, and this is an actual
16	phone line into the intake entry and re-attaches the phone.	16	picture from inside the mine that shows
17	Wilfong, Hofer, Toler,	17	shows the damaged stopping.
18	Schoonover and Jones make it to 57	18	This particular stopping
19	crosscut by hanging ventilation	19	was constructed of concrete block, and
20	curtain. Misters Jones and Hofer are	20	you can see, as Chris is showing with
21	sent outby to retrieve more supplies	21	the cursor, the piece of the stopping
22	and to check for stoppings or controls	22	that's left in place. And the blocks
23	that may have been missed on the way	23	that have been displaced by the forces
24	in.	24	of the explosion.
25	One of the issues with	25	When the gentlemen were
	One of the issues with		When the gentionion word
	Page 1022		Page 1024
1	using the animation is, if you it's	1	proceeding inby, they were repairing or
2	hard to stop and start. If you get a	2	attempting to repair this damage by
3	little ahead of yourself, you have to	_	
1		3	installing curtains. And just to give
4	go back and run through a little	3 4	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a
	run through some things again. So I		• • •
4 5 6	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition.	4	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary
4 5 6 7	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they	4 5	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations.
4 5 6 7 8	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and	4 5 6 7 8	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the
4 5 6 7 8 9	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies	4 5 6 7 8 9	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine
4 5 6 7 8 9	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have	4 5 6 7 8 9 10	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to
4 5 6 7 8 9 10	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler,	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners,
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make it to Number 58 crosscut, but are	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were they, where were they and what were
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make it to Number 58 crosscut, but are unsuccessful due to the amounts of	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were they, where were they and what were they doing? The physical evidence that
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make it to Number 58 crosscut, but are unsuccessful due to the amounts of smoke and high levels of carbon monoxide. They try to contact the	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were they, where were they and what were they doing? The physical evidence that was gathered inby and outby the sealed area, the testimony from the 70 persons that were interviewed, the likelihood
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make it to Number 58 crosscut, but are unsuccessful due to the amounts of smoke and high levels of carbon monoxide. They try to contact the Two Left crew for about 20 minutes by shouting and yelling and received no response. Then they make a decision to leave the mine by the intake entry, because of the dense smoke and carbon monoxide inby the 57 crosscut.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were they, where were they and what were they doing? The physical evidence that was gathered inby and outby the sealed area, the testimony from the 70 persons that were interviewed, the likelihood of fuel for the explosion, both inby and outby the seals, as well as the likelihood of ignition sources, both inby and outby the seals. And one thing, as I mentioned early on in the first couple
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	run through some things again. So I apologize for the repetition. As I mentioned, once they arrived at the 57 crosscut, Jones and Hofer are sent outby for more supplies and to check for controls that may have been missed on the way in. Toler, Wilfong and Schoonover attempt to make it to Number 58 crosscut, but are unsuccessful due to the amounts of smoke and high levels of carbon monoxide. They try to contact the Two Left crew for about 20 minutes by shouting and yelling and received no response. Then they make a decision to leave the mine by the intake entry, because of the dense smoke and carbon	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	you an idea, I mean, the curtains are a temporary means of directing the air and can be used in temporary situations. So where did the explosion start? In order to determine that, the investigators continue to look at the activities of the miners, as we just showed earlier, who were they, where were they and what were they doing? The physical evidence that was gathered inby and outby the sealed area, the testimony from the 70 persons that were interviewed, the likelihood of fuel for the explosion, both inby and outby the seals, as well as the likelihood of ignition sources, both inby and outby the seals. And one thing, as I

1	Page 1025 We didn't get into the mine until	1	Page 1027 methane was to determine the volume of
1 2	o a constant of the constant o	1 2	
3	January 26th. And in the interim, there was a lot of a lot of	3	the area inby the seals. And this was
			done by taking survey data that was
4 5	speculation about what had happened, a lot of media attention and a lot of	4 5	obtained while the mining was going on
		_	in the old Two Left section, as well as
6 7	I guess a lot of unconfirmed reports about things at the mine.	6 7	survey information that was taken during the investigation.
8	One thing that myself, as	8	As we had talked and
9	well as all the accident investigation	9	some of the other panels had discussed,
10	team members, we made a commitment to	10	the parts of the old Two Left section
11	ourselves not to be unduly influenced	11	were bottom mined, and this, in fact,
12	by some of the speculation that was	12	made determining the volume a bit more
13	there and form our own opinions based	13	difficult, as some of the areas had
14	on the observations that we made in the	14	accumulated water, some were up to
15	mine, and based on the information that	15	probably 18-feet high.
16	we had gathered firsthand.	16	The volume of the sealed
17	The results of the	17	area was determined to be a bit over
18	investigation indicate that the	18	four million cubic feet.
19	explosion was initiated inby the seals	19	Methane the methane
20	in the old Two Left section. How do we	20	is continuing to be evaluated. We
21	arrive at this? We showed a slide	21	continue to look at the examination
22	earlier that, in fact, all of the seals	22	records of the concentrations that were
23	were blown in an outby direction,	23	in the atmosphere while mining was
24	indicating that the forces came from	24	occurring inby the old Two Left seals.
25	within. That methane accumulated inby	25	We looked at the gas wells that were
			The residual at the gas trone that here
	Page 1026		Page 1028
1	the seals, and that any methane	1	in that area. Those have been
2	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred	2	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels
2	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted	2	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed
2 3 4	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the	2 3 4	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation.
2 3 4 5	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine.	2	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also
2 3 4 5 6	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible	2 3 4 5 6	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations
2 3 4 5 6 7	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion?	2 3 4 5 6 7	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the seals. And we are continuing to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately 14,000. Some mines throughout the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the seals. And we are continuing to evaluate the accumulation in the sealed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately 14,000. Some mines throughout the country, in some of the gasier coal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the seals. And we are continuing to evaluate the accumulation in the sealed area.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately 14,000. Some mines throughout the country, in some of the gasier coal seams have a tendency or do, in fact,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the seals. And we are continuing to evaluate the accumulation in the sealed area. One bit of information	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately 14,000. Some mines throughout the country, in some of the gasier coal seams have a tendency or do, in fact, liberate methane in excess of 10 to 100
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the seals, and that any methane accumulations that may have occurred outby the seals would have been diluted by the ventilation currents in the mine. What are the possible sources of fuel for the explosion? Methane and coal dust are the two. Methane is a colorless, odorless gas that's lighter than air and explosive in methane air concentrations in 5 to 15 percent. Coal dust is very explosive, and can, in fact, propagate explosions when suspended. The final two seals of the ten were completed on January or excuse me, on December 11th of 2005. For the next 22 days, methane accumulated inby the seals. And we are continuing to evaluate the accumulation in the sealed area.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	in that area. Those have been discussed in some of the earlier panels to see if they could have contributed to the methane accumulation. And the team also conducted two liberation investigations of the sealed area. One on February 7th through the 9th, and the second on March 2nd and 3rd. And the preliminary information from those two investigations indicates a daily liberation rate of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. And just to put this in a bit of perspective, I guess, the mine is as you heard earlier, averaged approximately 100,000 cubic feet per day liberation. The area inby the seals we looked at is approximately 14,000. Some mines throughout the country, in some of the gasier coal seams have a tendency or do, in fact,

			2
1	Page 1029	1	Page 1031
1 2	mentioned, some mines may, in fact, liberate more than ten million cubic	1 2	of this roof support system at Sago Mine consists of a roof bolt used in
3	feet of methane per day.	3	conjunction with an eight-inch bolt
4	Coal dust as a	4	plate, and a 16-inch square pan or
5	contributor to the explosion, we looked	5	spider plate. Roof mesh, as shown here
6	at the testimony and information that	6	under the spider plate is also
7	was gathered during the interviews,	7	frequently used, but primarily limited
8	looked at the mine records while mining	8	to the belt entry, the track entry and
9	was ongoing in that area, then we	9	the primary escapeway.
10	conducted a mine dust survey to	10	The direction and
11	determine the incombustibility content	11	intensity of the spider plate and bolt
12	in areas inby and outby the seals.	12	plate bending assisted the flames and
13	An alcohol coke test was	13	forces, investigation team in
14	also was also completed, and	14	interpreting the direction and
15	results indicate that the flame from	15	intensity of the blast forces.
16	the explosion ended somewhere in the	16	You can see the bottom
17	vicinity of the old Two Left seals.	17	picture has a bent corner, and some of
18	To kind of summarize the	18	these were bent less, some were bent
19	summarize the fuel category, we do	19	more. So from that, you can infer
20	have the information from the	20	velocity of the blast that came by this
21	liberation studies, and looking at that	21	plate, and also, you can infer the
22	as well as the volume inby the sealed	22	blast direction. This slide shows one
23	area does indicate the potential for	23	bend, many plates showed multiple
24	explosive mixtures. And also indicates	24	bends. By looking at the sequence of
25	that methane was the primary fuel for	25	bending and which bends were over the
1	Page 1030	1	Page 1032
1	the explosion, although coal dust may	1	top of other bends, you can reconstruct
2	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the	2	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces.
2 3	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event.	2	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather
2 3 4	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I	2 3 4	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not
2 3 4 5	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the	2	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate.
2 3 4 5 6	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old	2 3 4 5 6	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined
2 3 4 5 6 7	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces	2 3 4 5 6 7	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area near spads 4010, 4011, 4047 and 4048, as you see depicted by the red circle in the arrow. MR. HIEB: The square pans, which are also called spider plates are commonly used for supplemental roof support. As shown here, they are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to interpret the patterns of a single and multiple force direction were used, such as pockets of compacted coal and soot and clay pins and spaces between pans and the roof. As discussed yesterday, the deformations and deflections of L-shaped steel belt hangers were recorded
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area near spads 4010, 4011, 4047 and 4048, as you see depicted by the red circle in the arrow. MR. HIEB: The square pans, which are also called spider plates are commonly used for supplemental roof support. As shown here, they are basically a thin metal plate that provides additional passive support to the area immediately around the bolt. They prove to be an important tool, as well, in attributing the blast forces	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to interpret the patterns of a single and multiple force direction were used, such as pockets of compacted coal and soot and clay pins and spaces between pans and the roof. As discussed yesterday, the deformations and deflections of L-shaped steel belt hangers were recorded in seal location selected locations in and around the sealed area during the investigation in order to make some empirical determinations about the degree of bending, and estimate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area near spads 4010, 4011, 4047 and 4048, as you see depicted by the red circle in the arrow. MR. HIEB: The square pans, which are also called spider plates are commonly used for supplemental roof support. As shown here, they are basically a thin metal plate that provides additional passive support to the area immediately around the bolt. They prove to be an important tool, as well, in attributing the blast forces back in the various areas behind the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to interpret the patterns of a single and multiple force direction were used, such as pockets of compacted coal and soot and clay pins and spaces between pans and the roof. As discussed yesterday, the deformations and deflections of L-shaped steel belt hangers were recorded in seal location selected locations in and around the sealed area during the investigation in order to make some empirical determinations about the degree of bending, and estimate pressures and velocities of forces.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area near spads 4010, 4011, 4047 and 4048, as you see depicted by the red circle in the arrow. MR. HIEB: The square pans, which are also called spider plates are commonly used for supplemental roof support. As shown here, they are basically a thin metal plate that provides additional passive support to the area immediately around the bolt. They prove to be an important tool, as well, in attributing the blast forces back in the various areas behind the seals during the explosion.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to interpret the patterns of a single and multiple force direction were used, such as pockets of compacted coal and soot and clay pins and spaces between pans and the roof. As discussed yesterday, the deformations and deflections of L-shaped steel belt hangers were recorded in seal location selected locations in and around the sealed area during the investigation in order to make some empirical determinations about the degree of bending, and estimate pressures and velocities of forces. The illustration here was in the Number
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the explosion, although coal dust may have, in fact, participated in the event. The investigation, as I mentioned, determined that the explosion was initiated inby the old Two Left seals, and that the forces within the sealed area all appear to propagate in directions from an area near spads 4010, 4011, 4047 and 4048, as you see depicted by the red circle in the arrow. MR. HIEB: The square pans, which are also called spider plates are commonly used for supplemental roof support. As shown here, they are basically a thin metal plate that provides additional passive support to the area immediately around the bolt. They prove to be an important tool, as well, in attributing the blast forces back in the various areas behind the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	top of other bends, you can reconstruct a sequence of blast forces. Because this is rather subjective, care had to be taken to not base too much on one isolated plate. So populations of plates were examined together to make judgments about forces. Other information to interpret the patterns of a single and multiple force direction were used, such as pockets of compacted coal and soot and clay pins and spaces between pans and the roof. As discussed yesterday, the deformations and deflections of L-shaped steel belt hangers were recorded in seal location selected locations in and around the sealed area during the investigation in order to make some empirical determinations about the degree of bending, and estimate pressures and velocities of forces.

	Pogo 1022		Page 102E
1	Page 1033 Omega seal Number Six, and includes	1	Page 1035 perspective.
2	both a plan view and a profile view of	2	Lightning strikes on the
3	the orientation of the belt hangers	3	surface may have been conducted under -
4	showing the three dimensional	4	conducted underground through the
5	information necessary to calculate four	5	mine electrical system, including the
6	spectors and assess the amount of	6	high voltage cable, the equipment and
7	inflicted structural deformation.	7	structures. It would also include the
8	Well, I would just	8	conveyor belt, the mine track, as it
9	recognize that this data does not	9	proceeded from the outside to the
10	provide 100 percent reliable	10	portal inby to Two a stopping just
11	information. It does serve its purpose	11	outby the old Two Left seals. The
12	in helping quantify and document the	12	surface mine telephone communication,
13	direction and magnitude of forces in a	13	gas wells and interconnected piping
14	way that when viewed statistically can	14	between the wells, the mine watering
15	be used to supplement our understanding	15	system and also, as was discussed
16	of the sequence and magnitude of	16	yesterday, the possibility of lightning
17	explosion forces.	17	proceeding through this track.
18	After this sample study	18	Again, as we discussed in
19	area was compiled and distributed, ICG	19	great detail yesterday, it was a
20	kindly provided the survey personnel	20	possibility of lightning as an ignition
21	and equipment necessary to continue	21	source. And one of the other sources
22	this work. And so this mapping has	22	that the MSHA and West Virginia
23	been performed over most of the	23	investigation teams continue to explore
24	remainder of the sealed area where the	24	is a possibility of roof falls as an
25	belt hangers were present.	25	ignition source to the event.
1	Page 1034	1	Other ignition sources
1	Other clues used to	1	Other ignition sources
2	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude	2	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I
2	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And	2	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the
2 3 4	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post-	2 3 4	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived
2 3 4 5	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in postexplosion geometry of ventilation	2 3 4 5	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the
2 3 4 5 6	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block	2 3 4 5 6	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and
2 3 4 5 6 7	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping.	2 3 4 5 6 7	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3 you can generate .3 very easily by	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in the explosion. This information is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3 you can generate .3 very easily by with a person walking across carpet	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in the explosion. This information is preliminary and is being shared at this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3 you can generate .3 very easily by with a person walking across carpet on a dry day. The static electricity	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in the explosion. This information is preliminary and is being shared at this time at the request of the parties
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3 you can generate .3 very easily by with a person walking across carpet on a dry day. The static electricity that may be generated due to that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in the explosion. This information is preliminary and is being shared at this time at the request of the parties present here today. It is not meant to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Other clues used to determine blast direction and magnitude include wire mesh breakdown areas. And the severity of damage in post- explosion geometry of ventilation controls, such as this cinder block stopping. MR. GATES: The minimum temperature to ignite an explosive methane air mixture is approximately 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. It can easily be ignited by weak electrical spark, frictional spark, heated surface or an open flame. And I know one of the panels yesterday mentioned that the amount of energy required to do this is approximately .3 millijoules. Just to put that .3 millijoules in perspective, it's3 you can generate .3 very easily by with a person walking across carpet on a dry day. The static electricity	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Other ignition sources were looked at early on. As I mentioned, we came into the investigation without any preconceived notions, started looking at the equipment starting on the surface, and as we worked our way into the mine, examined all of the electrical equipment, all of the mining equipment as we moved in to determine whether or not it may have had an impact on the event. The two sources that we continue to investigate are lightning and roof falls. MR. HIEB: Okay. What I'll briefly address is the information we have about the possible role of lightning in the explosion. This information is preliminary and is being shared at this time at the request of the parties

	2 402		5 400
4	Page 1037	1	Page 1039
1	As discussed earlier, the	1	of a subtle seismic event recorded by
2	explosion appears to have originated in	2	Martin Chapman, as it was mentioned
3	a particular part of the sealed area.	3	yesterday of Virginia Tech, was from
4	And this is some distance back from the	4	the seismograph station near
5	seals themselves. This area is	5	Morgantown, West Virginia. This was
6	approximately under 300 feet depth of	6	also pegged through the GPS clock time
7	cover. That's distance to the surface,	7	run by the folks that maintain that
8	and almost two miles away from the	8	piece of equipment.
9	closest known lightning strike.	9	And it apparently showed
10	The primary questions	10	a disturbance, which could have been
11	which beg answers are, number one, what	11	from Sago between one to five seconds
12	makes lightning a persistent suspect in	12	later. Next slide.
13	the explosion. And two, how could	13	At least two, perhaps
14	lightning enter the mine?	14	three lightning strikes were recorded
15	The first piece of	15	by companies that examine and document
16	evidence is the timing between the	16	that information near Sago Mine at that
17	explosion and the lightning. And this	17	time. These strokes are shown in this
18	is the most important one. On this	18	slide as locations one, two, three.
19	illustration the on this	19	Next slide.
20	illustration, a little note tag	20	The first stroke was
21	pointing to the red line is pointing at	21	recorded at 6:26:35.522 seconds, and is
22	the Omega seals. The big tag is	22	located approximately 1.2 miles south
23	pointing to the location of the CO	23	of the Sago Mine portal. It registered
24	monitor at 57 block. The CO monitors	24	a positive 38.8 killiamps on the
25	are linked to a computer outside in the	25	National Lightning Detection Network,
	David 4000		
			Page 1040
1	Page 1038	1	Page 1040
1	mine dispatcher's office.	1	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one.
2	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows	2	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke
2	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the	2	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later,
2 3 4	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped	2 3 4	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the
2	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location.	2	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very
2 3 4 5 6	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others	2 3 4 5 6	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National
2 3 4 5 6 7	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per	2 3 4 5 6 7	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds fast. This places the actual corrected	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at strike location number two. This is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds fast. This places the actual corrected time of the 51 part per million CO	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at strike location number two. This is the large 101 killiamp hit. A large
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds fast. This places the actual corrected time of the 51 part per million CO spike at 57 block at approximately 6:26	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at strike location number two. This is the large 101 killiamp hit. A large Poplar tree showing obvious lightning
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds fast. This places the actual corrected time of the 51 part per million CO spike at 57 block at approximately 6:26 and 35 seconds on the morning of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at strike location number two. This is the large 101 killiamp hit. A large Poplar tree showing obvious lightning damage was found very close to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mine dispatcher's office. The CO monitor log shows that at 6:31 and 31 seconds on the morning of January 2nd an alarm tripped at a CO monitor at this location. Within seconds, this monitor and others nearby red lined at 107 parts per million then went offline. The explosion is believed to have occurred at the beginning of this sequence. As part of our investigation, the accuracy of the clock for the CO monitor computer was tested, comparing it to a GPS clock. An independent consultant was hired to perform this work on January 14th, 2006. At this time, a discovery was made that the computer clock was running four minutes and 56 seconds fast. This places the actual corrected time of the 51 part per million CO spike at 57 block at approximately 6:26	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as interpreted by Vaisala. Next one. The second stroke occurred a fraction of a second later, approximately one mile northwest of the Sago Mine portal. It registered a very large 101 killiamps on the National Lightning Detection Network. The third strike location was recorded by the U.S. Precision Lightning Network, and interpreted by WeatherBug at a location approximately one half mile south of the Sago Mine portal. Its timing appears to be precisely the same as strike number two, and very close to the same magnitude or amperage. On January 6th, 2006, physical evidence of a direct lightning strike was discovered and documented at strike location number two. This is the large 101 killiamp hit. A large Poplar tree showing obvious lightning

	D 404		D 4040
1	Page 1041 a handheld GPS unit. This is a	1	Page 1043 This line passes within 200 feet or se
2		2	This line passes within 300 feet or so
3	photograph of this tree taken on	3	of the Poplar tree.
	January 6th. A spiral gash runs from the base of the tree to what is left of		Likewise, a public
4		4	telephone line passes very near the
5	the top of its trunk. A debris field	5	Poplar tree and extends to the mine
6	of wood, which splintered away from	6	office at Sago Mine.
7	this tree strike covers a radius of	7	Investigations are
8	approximately 150 feet.	8	ongoing into the possibility that
9	No physical damage due to	9	voltage or current may have entered the
10	lightning has been found at strike,	10	electrical conductors or grounding
11	locations one or three, despite	11	systems of one or both of these utility
12	multiple field searches. Because the	12	lines, either as A, the result of
13	time corrected 51 part per million CO	13	direct transfer of electrical energy
14	monitor event is so close to the time	14	from the lightning strike, or B, the
15	of the confirmed lightning strike,	15	result of induced electrical energy due
16	literally to the nearest second, we	16	to the magnetic flux of the lightning
17	found this circumstantial evidence	17	discharge in close proximity.
18	significant and difficult to dismiss.	18	Once at the portal, this
19	Subsequently, an	19	electrical energy could have been
20	inventory of utility and transmission	20	transferred into the mine via belt
21	lines was begun to determine if	21	structure or track. This, too, is
22	metallic conductors exist between the	22	being investigated at this time.
23	confirmed lightning strike and Sago	23	The possibility that
24	Mine, specifically, the sealed area at	24	voltage may have entered the mine
25	Sago Mine.	25	directly over the sealed area by other
	Page 1042		Page 1044
1	Page 1042 But with the cooperation	1	Page 1044 means is also being investigated.
1 2	But with the cooperation	1 2	means is also being investigated.
2	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators	2	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at
2	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map	2	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof
2 3 4	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and	2 3 4	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary
2 3 4 5	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and	2	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far
2 3 4 5 6	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if	2 3 4 5 6	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was
2 3 4 5 6 7	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar	2 3 4 5 6 7	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of the Poplar tree to the Sago Mine	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue shaded area at the top end was under
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of the Poplar tree to the Sago Mine portals.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue shaded area at the top end was under water at the time of the explosion.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of the Poplar tree to the Sago Mine portals. This is the 12.4	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue shaded area at the top end was under water at the time of the explosion. A dewater pump remains
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of the Poplar tree to the Sago Mine portals. This is the 12.4 killivolt private power line, leading	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue shaded area at the top end was under water at the time of the explosion. A dewater pump remains abandoned at the end of this water
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	But with the cooperation of the overlying oil and gas operators in the area, we began compiling a map of the network of active gas lines and all known gas wells, both active and abandoned, in the area to determine if any connection exists with the Poplar tree strike. While several active and abandoned gas wells occurred near the sealed area, there are no casings known at this time which actually penetrate the mine works. So far no other boring, such as coreholes, boreholes or water wells are known to have penetrated into the sealed mine works at the time of the explosion. We have also looked at conductors leading from the vicinity of the Poplar tree to the Sago Mine portals. This is the 12.4	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	means is also being investigated. Wire roof mesh is used at Sago Mine as a supplemental roof support in the track, belt and primary escapeway entries. However, at the far end of the sealed area, wire mesh was installed universally over a sizeable area, whereby the roof and all entries and all crosscuts were covered in continuous wire mesh with a few exceptions. This represents several miles of contiguous eight-gauge wire bound together with the supporting roof bolts, plates and pans in a sizeable concentrated metal mass. Areas inby the seals where the roof was wire meshed are shown here in green and blue. The blue shaded area at the top end was under water at the time of the explosion. A dewater pump remains

1	Page 1045	1		age 1047
1 2	along the old track entry where it	1 2	there was a picture that was shown yesterday, and just another	
3	terminates at a cathead or coupler near spad 4011.	3	characterization of that area.	
4	Where this cable	4	MR. HIEB:	
5	terminates at the coupler is in the	5	As indicated, roof falls	
6	vicinity of where the explosion is	6	are still under investigation. And	
7	believed to have originated. Because	7	indicated here are a cluster of roof	
8	the pump control box is believed to	8	falls that occurred at different times.	
9	have been underwater at the time of the	9	Actual timing is rather subjective,	
10	explosion, the cable is likely to have	10	and a matter of interpretation, but	
11	been electrically common with the wire	11	these are currently under review.	
12	mesh at that time.	12	MR. UROSEK:	
13	It is currently being	13	I'd like to talk to you a	
14	investigated, whether this arrangement	14	little bit about the seals and some of	
15	of wire mesh could have been an	15	the work that we're conducting in that	
16	attractive target for stray lightning	16	area. As we all know, the seals failed	
17	penetrating the earth through geologic	17	catastrophically in this event. A	
18	fracture zones, or perhaps by an	18	little history is that the federal	
19	abandoned well casing that so far has	19	regulations do require that all areas	
20	gone undetected.	20	of a coal mine either be ventilated or	
21	Alternately, the possible	21	sealed.	
22	role of electromagnetically-induced	22	The regulations also	
23	currents and voltage into the wire	23	state that to seal an area off, it can	
24	mesh, pump and cable remains to be	24	be constructed of solid concrete	
25	investigated.	25	blocks. And it specifies in the	
				-
1	Page 1046	1		age 1048
1	In addition, we continue	1	regulations how that method can be	age 1048
2	In addition, we continue to evaluate the other potential	2	regulations how that method can be accomplished. It also states that	age 1048
2	In addition, we continue to evaluate the other potential ignition causes besides lightning.	2	regulations how that method can be accomplished. It also states that there's alternative methods that can be	age 1048
2 3 4	In addition, we continue to evaluate the other potential ignition causes besides lightning. MR. GATES:	2 3 4	regulations how that method can be accomplished. It also states that there's alternative methods that can be used to seal up an area.	age 1048
2 3 4 5	In addition, we continue to evaluate the other potential ignition causes besides lightning. MR. GATES: An anomaly in the mine	2 3 4 5	regulations how that method can be accomplished. It also states that there's alternative methods that can be used to seal up an area. And in '92, a program was	age 1048
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1	Page 1049	1	Page 1051
1 2	previous to that. They provided the	1 2	and it shows that that seal, as tested
3	guidance, and that was the information that MSHA used to make the	3	in 2001, did pass the test in 2006. It was exposed to a pressure of 23 psi,
4		3 4	and it did pass the leakage test prior
5	determination that the 20 psi was	5	to that.
6	appropriate. It's also based on	6	As part of that, a second
7	explosion experience. Explosions that	7	seal was also tested. We called it a
8	had actually occurred within the mining	8	hybrid seal. Some of the construction
9	industry since that time in the	9	methods used at the Sago Mine were
10	investigation of those accidents.	10	different than was specified in the
11	Some of the things that we're	11	2001 approval for this type of method.
12	doing, we have a number of plans to	12	We used some of those differences in
13	actually determine what happened to	13	this test, but we did not use all of
14	these seals. We're actually going to	14	them.
15	conduct laboratory analysis of the	15	As we were constructing
16	blocks, not only from the Sago Mine,	16	the hybrid seal, we learned a lot about
17	but from blocks Omega blocks	17	how the seal could be constructed and
18	located at the various plants at	18	the way it was constructed at the Sago
19	various mines throughout the country.	19	Mine. So what we did is, we went back
20	We're going to do compressive strength	20	and we re-interviewed some of the folks
21	testing and other evaluations of those.	21	that actually built that seal to get
22	We're going to do an	22	specific information, or more specific
23	analysis of the mortar joints,	23	information on how those seals were
24	especially the mortar at the bottom	24	constructed.
25	where the seals were first started,	25	Future tests will include
	Page 1050	4	Page 1052
1	along the floor. We're going to be	1	all of the methods that we were able to
2	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine	2	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope
2	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine and evaluating that.	2	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope to have the next tests scheduled for
2 3 4	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine and evaluating that. A major focus, however,	2 3 4	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope to have the next tests scheduled for some time in May.
2 3 4 5	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine and evaluating that. A major focus, however, will be on full-scale explosion	2 3 4 5	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope to have the next tests scheduled for some time in May. It's going to take a
2 3 4 5 6	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine and evaluating that. A major focus, however, will be on full-scale explosion testing. Now, some of the things that	2 3 4 5 6	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope to have the next tests scheduled for some time in May. It's going to take a series of tests to complete this. And
2 3 4 5 6 7	along the floor. We're going to be doing some further testing in the mine and evaluating that. A major focus, however, will be on full-scale explosion testing. Now, some of the things that we need to determine by this explosion	2 3 4 5 6 7	all of the methods that we were able to obtain from those interviews. We hope to have the next tests scheduled for some time in May. It's going to take a series of tests to complete this. And after each time we build the seals, we
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1	Page 1053	1	Page 1055 Once the information is
1 2	printouts from there, and we're also looking at the computer, itself, to get	1 2	obtained from that, then we'll be able
3	some of the data to better understand	3	to take the proper steps as far as
4	the results of some of that information	3 4	these SCSRS.
5	from that system.	5	One of the things we are
6	We're also looking at the	6	going to do in the future, next week,
7	SCSRs that were used by both the Two	7	MSHA and the State of West Virginia
8	Left crew and the One Left crew. As you	8	will initiate a joint program to ensure
9	all know, the information provided by	9	that all miners are properly trained in
10	Mr. McCloy in his note to the families	10	the procedures for donning and
11	has provided us a lot of good	11	exchanging SCSRs. They're going to
12	information.	12	take a special focus in this effort
13	We're looking forward and	13	during their regular inspection process
14	hope to soon be able to interview Mr.	14	and make sure the SCSR training
15	McCloy and get additional information	15	requirements are implemented. West
16	so that we know more about exactly what	16	Virginia will be doing that in the
17	happened to these SCSRs.	17	State of West Virginia, and MSHA will
18	We did do some testing to	18	be doing that across the United States.
19	date on the SCSRs. The testing that	19	We will also actively
20	we've completed so far does indicate	20	monitor coal mine operators. Their
21	that they did react when they they	21	testing of the functionality of these
22	did start when the miners tried to do	22	SCSRs to make sure that they are doing
23	that. Exactly what happened, we don't	23	the testing that's required, and to
24	know at this point. We need to talk to	24	make sure that they are checking them
25	Mr. McCloy and find more about that.	25	to make sure that they're not too old,
1	Page 1054	1	Page 1056
1	We know that a percentage	1	or that they are working properly. So
2	We know that a percentage of the chemical that's in these units	2	or that they are working properly. So we're going to be doing that. But we
2	We know that a percentage of the chemical that's in these units were used. Some of them as low as 25	2	or that they are working properly. So we're going to be doing that. But we do anticipate doing future things,
2 3 4	We know that a percentage of the chemical that's in these units were used. Some of them as low as 25 percent, some of them as high as 72	2 3 4	or that they are working properly. So we're going to be doing that. But we do anticipate doing future things, depending on what we learn from Mr.
2 3 4 5	We know that a percentage of the chemical that's in these units were used. Some of them as low as 25 percent, some of them as high as 72 percent. We're continuing to evaluate	2 3 4 5	or that they are working properly. So we're going to be doing that. But we do anticipate doing future things, depending on what we learn from Mr. McCloy.
2 3 4 5 6	We know that a percentage of the chemical that's in these units were used. Some of them as low as 25 percent, some of them as high as 72 percent. We're continuing to evaluate that. We're continuing to evaluate	2 3 4 5 6	or that they are working properly. So we're going to be doing that. But we do anticipate doing future things, depending on what we learn from Mr. McCloy. As Richard said, our
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1	CHAID	Page 1057	1	Page 1059
1	CHAIR:		1 2	for a brief break, which we'll do
2	Just one question for Mr.		3	which we can do. We also brought up an
	Hieb. Could you speak to the anomaly			Omega block, which people can examine
4	in the roof? I know you're a fossil		4	here. This is from the Sago Mine. ICG
5	man. With your expertise, can you address that as well?		5	sent it around, and we can take a look
6	MR. HIEB:		6	at it during the break. SHORT BREAK TAKEN
7	Yes. We had looked at		7	CHAIR:
8			8 9	We have a demonstration
10	that, and the appearance of it was			
11	something that warranted looking at it as hard as we have. It has been		10 11	today with the Omega block. ICG sent
12			12	in one of their Omega blocks. Dan and
13	examined both from the standpoint of		13	Russell, if you could pick it up. It is
14	materials testing and from the standpoint of, is it possibly a track		14	the advantage that it has over cinder blocks, obviously, is it's much
15	for plant fossils.		15	lighter and easier to cut and to deal
16	I can't speak to the		16	with.
17	results of the first testing, because		17	
18	that's not been made available to us		18	A disadvantage is that the it tends to break off easily,
19	yet, but as to the preliminary		19	as was done by Dan here using his
20	information regarding its association		20	strength. But what it leaves is a
21	with the plant fossil, there does		21	priable or a rough edge. And that
22	appear to be an association with the		22	the problem there is that you
23	carbon films that are found on the		23	it's more difficult to get a seal and
24	surface of the anomaly, with what's		23 24	to get a when you put the bond on,
25	consistent with what you would find		25	it's more difficult to get that sealed
23	consistent with what you would find		23	it's more difficult to get that scaled
		Page 1058		Page 1060
1	with a plant fossil. And that's	Page 1058	1	-
1 2	with a plant fossil. And that's preliminary. We've not seen a report	Page 1058	1 2	area, thus permitting on occasion, the
	with a plant fossil. And that's preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on	Page 1058		-
2	preliminary. We've not seen a report	Page 1058	2	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through.
2	preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on	Page 1058	2	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through. And that's a concern that you have when
2 3 4	preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on that currently.	Page 1058	2 3 4	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through. And that's a concern that you have when you use Omega block types.
2 3 4	preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on that currently. CHAIR:	Page 1058	2 3 4 5	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through. And that's a concern that you have when you use Omega block types. And all seals breathe in
2 3 4 5 6	preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on that currently. CHAIR: What's the plant that you	Page 1058	2 3 4 5 6	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through. And that's a concern that you have when you use Omega block types. And all seals breathe in and out and that's expected when you
2 3 4 5 6 7	preliminary. We've not seen a report on that yet. But that's the status on that currently. CHAIR: What's the plant that you suspect it might be?	Page 1058	2 3 4 5 6 7	area, thus permitting on occasion, the block to allow methane to go through. And that's a concern that you have when you use Omega block types. And all seals breathe in and out and that's expected when you have barometric pressure change. That's
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1	Page 1061	1	Page 1063
1 2	Omega block and the roof itself. And that has to be also bonded and glued or	1 2	evaluation we're undergoing. CHAIR:
3	put together not glued but put a	3	Thank you, Russell and
4	seal on it. Did I miss anything?	4	Dan. and we'll leave the block up for
5	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:	5	the remainder of the day. And now what
6	How about the way they	6	we'll do is, Celeste can you make a
7	are installed?	7	block part of the record? That was a
8	CHAIR:	8	joke. In order to coordinate the
9	Well, the way they are	9	timing between the seismic clock in
10	installed, I couldn't address here, but	10	Morgantown and the company clock of the
11	the installation is follows a plan	11	CO monitor at 57 block, was the seismic
12	that is submitted by the company and	12	clock tested using the same atomic
13	that needs to be followed pretty	13	clock device or method? I'll direct
14	rigorously in order to make the blocks	14	that to Mr. Hieb.
15	work because of some of these	15	MR. HIEB:
16	limitations on it. All right.	16	The clock was not
17	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:	17	re-correlated by us, but it is
18	One family member is	18	maintained by the West Virginia
19	concerned about the crack that's in the	19	Geological Survey and I believe it's
20	block and would like that to be pointed	20	actually a station that is owned by the
21	out.	21	U.S.G.S. And I did contact somebody in
22	CHAIR:	22	Denver to confirm that it was on GPS
23	Identify yourself on the	23	clock time, which is universal time,
24	record.	24	the same time as atomic clock. And so
25	MR. MEREDITH:	25	the assumption was made that they were
	Page 1062		Page 1064
1	Page 1062 My name is Dan Meredith,	1	Page 1064 properly maintaining their clock to GPS
1 2	_	1 2	
	My name is Dan Meredith, the son-in-law of Jim Bennett. When these blocks are built, nobody knows		properly maintaining their clock to GPS
2 3 4	My name is Dan Meredith, the son-in-law of Jim Bennett. When these blocks are built, nobody knows how many cracks or how many bubbles are	2	properly maintaining their clock to GPS time. CHAIR: This question is directed to MSHA. Were there other miners that
2	My name is Dan Meredith, the son-in-law of Jim Bennett. When these blocks are built, nobody knows how many cracks or how many bubbles are going through these, because they're	2 3 4 5	properly maintaining their clock to GPS time. CHAIR: This question is directed to MSHA. Were there other miners that were interviewed that reported a
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1	Page 1065	1	Page 1067
1 2	I think, Davitt, I'll add just a little bit to John's response.	1 2	the for your report? MR. HIEB:
3	If I recall correctly, I do think that	3	No. No, I did not.
4	there was a one gentleman from the	4	CHAIR:
5	One Left crew who donned the SCSR. The	5	Thank you. This is for
6	gentleman had false teeth and said	6	Mr. Gates. Please explain the pumping
7	without his teeth that he did have some	7	of water before the explosion occurred
8	difficulty with the mouthpiece. I	8	and how much water was pumped after the
9	think I recollect that from one of the	9	explosion wasoccurred. That is the
10	one of the transcripts. There were	10	pumping, I think, that we're talking
11	also several several comments from	11	about in the sealed area, the pumping
12	miners from the One Left crew who had	12	of water process and then how much
13	donned their SCSRs, who indicated that	13	water was pumped and where was it
14	they worked, worked as they were	14	pumped to at the after the
15	designed to and that they had no	15	explosion as well.
16	problems with them. I do recall that	16	MR. GATES:
17	from some of the some of the	17	I guess I would answer
18	transcripts as well.	18	that prior to the event on January 2nd,
19	CHAIR:	19	I really I really could not tell
20	And a follow-up to that	20	you how much water was, in fact, being
21	with regard to that, how many	21	pumped from behind the behind the
22	subsequent to Mr. McCloy's testimony	22	sealed area. You know, prior to
23	- letter, how many SCSRs have been	23	prior to the in-mine investigation
24	tested in the field?	24	portion of the investigation beginning,
25	MR. GATES:	25	there were boreholes that were drilled.
	Page 1066	4	Page 1068
1	I'm not sure what you	1	And some water was, in fact, pumped
2	I'm not sure what you mean by tested tested in the field.	2	And some water was, in fact, pumped from those boreholes. As far as how
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	Page 1069	_	Page 1071
1	after the item was sealed, to your	1	Did the breaks in the
2	knowledge, was there pumping from the	2	cable appear to be prior to the
3	outside to de-water the area, after the	3	accident or post accident?
4	area was sealed?	4	MR. HIEB:
5	MR. UROSEK:	5	The preliminary evidence
6	To our knowledge, there	6	from the forensics done on the cable
7	was no pumping after the area was	7	ends is that they were pulled apart
8	sealed.	8	longitudinally in a way that may have
9	CHAIR:	9	been caused either by equipment before
10	Okay. Now, let me ask	10	the explosion or could have been pulled
11	Mr. Hieb, and as well, John, yourself,	11	apart during the explosion itself.
12	the pump that was described, I believe	12	CHAIR:
13	you described it, Mr. Hieb, the	13	Mr. Hieb, I know you to
14	de-watering pump that is in the sealed	14	be a person that doesn't engage in
15	area currently, that has not been	15	speculation. But for us, is there a
16	retrieved, then you describe a cable	16	possibility that this pump and the
17	that goes from that water pump, out to	17	cable had some connection to this
18	an area close to where we believe, or	18	explosion?
19	you believe, the explosion occurs. Can	19	MR. HIEB:
20	you talk a little bit about that, and	20	Because of the
21	perhaps John as well, what that pump	21	circumstantial evidence of the
22	was for, how that pump was connected to	22	termination of the pump cable at the
23	power and what is the condition of that	23	location of the explosion, or that the
24 25	cable and the pump as far as you know?	24 25	explosion is believed to have occurred,
25		25	and due to the large amount of
	Page 1070		Page 1072
1	Page 1070 MR. HIEB:	1	Page 1072 continuous metal, both in the roof
1 2	MR. HIEB:	1 2	continuous metal, both in the roof
	-		-
2	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was	2	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all
2	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of	2	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and
2 3 4	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation	2 3 4	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some
2 3 4 5	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason	2 3 4 5	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common
2 3 4 5 6	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no	2 3 4 5 6	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was
2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all	2 3 4 5 6 7	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the explosion. And the condition of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box was
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the explosion. And the condition of the pump is something we haven't ascertained at this time, because it's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box was hanging close to the roof and being submerged at the time of the explosion,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the explosion. And the condition of the pump is something we haven't ascertained at this time, because it's partially submerged and we have not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box was hanging close to the roof and being submerged at the time of the explosion, both the wire mesh in that location,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the explosion. And the condition of the pump is something we haven't ascertained at this time, because it's partially submerged and we have not been able to retrieve it yet.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box to the pump. That control box was hanging close to the roof and being submerged at the time of the explosion, both the wire mesh in that location, the pump and the control box would have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. HIEB: Okay. The pump was originally for de-watering that part of the mine, that's the lowest elevation in the sealed area, which is the reason the pump was set there. There was no power to it. The power was all withdrawn before the seals were constructed. The pump cable with the coupler was just at the cable ran from the pump approximately 1,350 feet to the coupler and terminated there. There was no power connected to it. The condition of the cable is it's broke in three places. These three breaks appear to be where it was not submerged under water. In other words, it was in open air at the believed to be in open air at the time of the explosion. And the condition of the pump is something we haven't ascertained at this time, because it's partially submerged and we have not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	continuous metal, both in the roof mesh, the plates, the bolts, all connected together into one mass and the fact that we also have some evidence to believe this was all common to the pump and cable at the time of the explosion, we're we can't rule it out as a possibility. And it was brought up today because it is one avenue that we're seriously investigating. CHAIR: You explained that the cable was common with the wire mesh. Can you explain that? MR. HIEB: The cable is connected to a control box several feet before it the cable runs from the control box was hanging close to the roof and being submerged at the time of the explosion, both the wire mesh in that location,

	Page 1073		Page 1075
1	preliminary water samples that we took	1	Yes.
2	indicated conductivity in the water due	2	CHAIR:
3	to dissolved minerals, and due to the	3	Thank you.
4	preliminary forensics indicating that	4	MR. DEAN:
5	there was water in the control box, and	5	Could I ask MSHA to
6	also testimony from one of the	6	please bring up that slide with the
7	inspectors that was affiliated with	7	pump box shown, and the cable?
8	recovery of that control box, we	8	CHAIR:
9	believe that any electrical charge or	9	Mr. Hieb, while they're
10	induced charge to the wire mesh would	10	doing that, how big was this pump and
11	have been common through those conduits	11	how much did it pump and where was it
12	with the cable, because I left	12	supposed to pump to?
13	out one part, the pump control box does	13	MR. HIEB:
14	not have gasket, as most of them do	14	I'm afraid I don't have
15	not, so it was not waterproof.	15	those details. I have not seen the
16	CHAIR:	16	pump, and I am not familiar with where
17	And were the water	17	the discharge of that pump was.
18	you said that water samples were taken	18	CHAIR:
19	from the area near the pump, and water	19	John, do you know?
20	samples were taken from the area in the	20	MR. UROSEK:
21	rock itself. And could you tell us	21	No, I don't.
22	what the results of those were?	22	CHAIR:
23	MR. HIEB:	23	Okay. Where was it
24	I don't have those in	24	supposed to pump to? I mean, what is
25	front of me, but I believe the relevant	25	supposed to pump out out of the
	Page 1074	_	Page 1076
1	numbers are the specific conductivity,	1	mine or?
2	which was between 400 and 460.	2	MR. HIEB:
3	CHAIR:	3	Yes, its purpose would
4	Mr. Hieb, in law school	4	have been to pump water through the
5	they didn't teach me much about what	5	mine works to a main discharge line
6 7	the means. Could you put that into	7	that would lead outside. CHAIR:
8	context? MR. HIEB:	8	And back through the mine
9	Yes. Those units are	9	works?
10		10	MR. HIEB:
11	basically the inverse of ohms, so if you wanted to convert that to	11	Yeah.
12	resistivity, I may be incorrect about	12	CHAIR:
13	that, but it would be similar to just	13	And it's down in the
14	taking the reciprocal of that number to	14	bottom where the water would be
15	determine the resistivity.	15	expected to collect, in that area;
16	CHAIR:	16	correct?
17		17	MR. HIEB:
1 ' /	Is that highly resistive		IVIIX. THED.
18	Is that highly resistive or low resistive?		
18 19	or low resistive?	18	Yes.
19	or low resistive? MR. HIEB:	18 19	Yes. CHAIR:
19 20	or low resistive? MR. HIEB: It's fairly low	18 19 20	Yes. CHAIR: Do you intend to seek out
19 20 21	or low resistive? MR. HIEB: It's fairly low resistive.	18 19 20 21	Yes. CHAIR: Do you intend to seek out and extract the pump from underground?
19 20 21 22	or low resistive? MR. HIEB: It's fairly low resistive. CHAIR:	18 19 20 21 22	Yes. CHAIR: Do you intend to seek out and extract the pump from underground? MR. HIEB:
19 20 21 22 23	or low resistive? MR. HIEB: It's fairly low resistive. CHAIR: Can we get copies of	18 19 20 21 22 23	Yes. CHAIR: Do you intend to seek out and extract the pump from underground? MR. HIEB: We made the attempt at
19 20 21 22	or low resistive? MR. HIEB: It's fairly low resistive. CHAIR:	18 19 20 21 22	Yes. CHAIR: Do you intend to seek out and extract the pump from underground? MR. HIEB:

1	Page 1077	4	Page 1079
1	remains at the face.	1	concrete or Omega, or for the seal
2	CHAIR:	2	itself?
3	I know that Mr. Urosek is	3	MR. UROSEK:
4	an expert on small boats and perhaps he	4	No. That's for the
5	could perhaps we could make another	5	block, the compressive strength of the
6	effort at trying to retrieve that pump.	6	block, yes.
7	I understand it's difficult, but I	7	CHAIR:
8	think the Committee feels certainly	8	And the requirement for
9	the Legislators feel that this is an	9	the seal is 20 psi?
10	important factor for our investigation.	10	MR. UROSEK:
11	And perhaps we can make the same	11	That's correct.
12	request to ICG to help us with to	12	CHAIR:
13	make that recovery. Okay. Thank you.	13	John, to your knowledge,
14		14	when did that when was that
15	This goes to the Omega	15	adopted?
16	blocks. What is the psi of concrete	16	MR. UROSEK:
17	blocks as compared to Omega blocks?	17	I believe the actual work
18	MR. UROSEK:	18	came from a publication by the Bureau
19	I might make an error in	19	of Mines and was published in about
20	the exact strength, but I can tell you	20	1971. And it was based on work that
21	that a concrete block is much stronger.	21	had been done for a number of decades
22	And I'm going to guess here that it's	22	before that, that they had done
23	somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000	23	explosion testing.
24	psi versus the Omega blocks are	23 24	CHAIR:
25	,		
23	somewhere in the neighborhood between	25	Have you had an
	Page 1078		Page 1080
1	Page 1078 80 and 200	1	Page 1080
1 2	80 and 200.	1	opportunity to review that?
2	80 and 200. CHAIR:	2	opportunity to review that? MR. UROSEK:
2	80 and 200. CHAIR: That 1,000 for concrete	2	opportunity to review that? MR. UROSEK: I did.
2 3 4	80 and 200. CHAIR: That 1,000 for concrete block versus?	2 3 4	opportunity to review that? MR. UROSEK: I did. CHAIR:
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1	Page 108'	_	Page 1083
1 2	why the 20 psi was the appropriate number.	1 2	good. MR. GATES:
3	Since that time, of	3	And I think I'll add a
	course there's been a number of		little bit to that. We understand that
4		4	
5	accidents that have been investigated	5	we will will never be able to
6	and explosions. And we were we	6	exactly duplicate or replicate the
7	have not been able to see a number	7	conditions at the Sago Mine. Lake Lynn
8	greater than 20 psi up until what we're	8	is a limestone mine and the dimensions
9	currently looking at. And we're unsure	9	are different, but we hope to replicate
10	at this point as to the exact pressure	10	it as closely as we can.
11	that was at the Sago Mine.	11	CHAIR:
12	CHAIR:	12	Okay. Yesterday the
13	I understand you haven't	13	query was posed that the trolley line
14	completed your conclusion, but do you	14	or the power line could have been one
15	think that the pressures were close to	15	way that the lightning traveled
16	20 or above 20 or in the range of 20	16	underground. Aren't phone lines
17	here or?	17	grounded where the trolley line or
18	MR. UROSEK:	18	power line were the trolley line or
19	At this point, as Richard	19	power line tested at Sago for proper
20	said, one of the things that important	20	grounding? Also if there was any way
21	to us is to keep an open mind.	21	of travel, how did it get also if
22	CHAIR:	22	this is a way of travel, how did it get
23	That's fine.	23	into the sealed area? That is how did
24	MR. UROSEK:	24	it get how did it go from outby to
25	And I think the testing	25	inby the seals? And I pose that to
		1	
	Page 1083		Page 1084
1	Page 1082 that we're doing at Lake Lynn is going		John and to Monte.
1 2	that we're doing at Lake Lynn is going	1	John and to Monte.
2	that we're doing at Lake Lynn is going to lead us to that determination.	1 2	John and to Monte. MR. UROSEK:
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2 3 4	that we're doing at Lake Lynn is going to lead us to that determination. CHAIR: And are we going to	1 2 3 4	John and to Monte. MR. UROSEK: Davitt, I guess that's one of the things that we're continuing
2 3 4 5	that we're doing at Lake Lynn is going to lead us to that determination. CHAIR: And are we going to are we going to have tests that mimic	1 2 3 4 5	John and to Monte. MR. UROSEK: Davitt, I guess that's one of the things that we're continuing to evaluate. We've heard some
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	D 1005		D 100
1	Page 1085 As a matter of fact,	1	Page 108 made? The seismograph.
2	that's one of the tests that we have	2	MR. GATES:
3	planned in the very near future. It	3	I can't respond to that,
4	just came across my desk	4	Davitt. I was not on the mine site
5	CHAIR:	5	during the rescue and recovery efforts.
6	All right.	6	CHAIR:
7	MR. UROSEK:	7	John, do you know?
8	actually, about a	8	MR. UROSEK:
9	week ago.	9	I didn't respond there
10	CHAIR:	10	until that I wasn't able to get
11	Is the test for the Omega	11	there until that evening. Apparently
12	blocks are you going to cure them	12	that decision was made prior to that.
13	the same length of time that the others	13	CHAIR:
14	the Sago Omega blocks were cured	14	Okay. Maybe what we can
15	and put up?	15	do is make that one part of the record
16	MR. UROSEK:	16	and we'll try to find an answer out for
17	Yes, we're going to try	17	that.
18	to do that. Eight of the ten blocks	18	Perhaps I skipped over
19	- or eight of the ten seals were in	19	 were the trolley lines and the power
20	place, we believe at this time, for at	20	and the phone lines found to be
21	least 28 days.	21	grounded during your investigation?
22	CHAIR:	22	MR. GATES:
23	Right.	23	There were, in fact, some
24	MR. UROSEK:	24	issues that were observed during the
25	So we do believe that	25	inspection of the trolley lines, or
	Page 1086		Page 108
1	these next series of tests will include	1	I'll just say of the mine mine
2	a curing period of 28 days.	2	system that dealt with grounding. And
3	CHAIR:	3	also with the installation of lightning
4	And I could go back to	4	arrestors was discussed in, I think,
5	the water trap, that you talked about,	5	one of the questions from one of the
6		_	one of the questions from one of the
ı	behind the seals. Could you explain	6	Panels yesterday. There have, in fact,
7	how that works and could methane travel		
7 8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6	Panels yesterday. There have, in fact,
7 8 9	how that works and could methane travel	6 7	Panels yesterday. There have, in fact, been some enforcement actions taken on the lightning arrestors. There have been some citations issued, non-
7 8 9 10	how that works and could methane travel through the water trap? MR. UROSEK: The water trap is located	6 7 8	Panels yesterday. There have, in fact, been some enforcement actions taken on the lightning arrestors. There have been some citations issued, non-contributory citations issued on
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	David 1000		Dama 1001
1	Page 1089 that the energy is going up the	1	Page 1091 that we're trying to connect here is,
2	main line or up the trolley line or up	2	does the failure to be grounded
3	the phone line, do those two connect?	3	properly have anything to do with the
	•	4	
4	Do your findings connect to that	5	passage of the energy to get through
5	question? MR. GATES:		the mine into the sealed area, if
6		6	that's the theory that we accept.
7	I'm sorry. Could	7	During the interviews
8 9	you? CHAIR:	8 9	with those who built the seals, was it
			determined if the mortar was placed at
10	Not a good one. I worked	10	all the joints as specified at each
11	on it for an hour and a half last	11	of the joints as specified in the
12	night. Let me try again. I understand	12	approved plans?
13	the citations, and that's one issue.	13	MR. UROSEK:
14	But the second question that we've	14	That's one of the areas
15	heard very much about, the potential,	15	that we're looking into. The area
16	from Doctor Novak, of the power coming	16	from the information we've received
17	into and through the trolley or the	17	so far, it appears that the method to
18	telephone line up toward the sealed	18	actually apply the mortar to the
19	areas from the face from the face	19	vertical joints of the blocks was by
20	of the mine into and up to where,	20	laying the blocks down dry and then by
21	perhaps, getting down into the seals	21	putting mortar on top of the blocks and
22	and exploding. That's the hypothesis	22	pushing the mortar actually down into
23	that he has. Does your finding with	23	the cracks to get it onto the vertical
24	regard to the failure to properly	24	joints. That actual construction
25	ground, or anything else, lead you to	25	method will be part of the next testing
	Page 1090		Page 1092
1	Page 1090 believe that those two might be	1	Page 1092 or maybe not the very next one, but
1 2	believe that those two might be		or maybe not the very next one, but
2	believe that those two might be connected, that that grounding would	1 2 3	or maybe not the very next one, but in the very near future, the testing
2 3	believe that those two might be connected, that that grounding would have something to do with the	2	or maybe not the very next one, but
2	believe that those two might be connected, that that grounding would	2	or maybe not the very next one, but in the very near future, the testing process that we'll be doing.
2 3 4 5	believe that those two might be connected, that that grounding would have something to do with the transmission of that energy up to the sealed area?	2 3 4 5	 or maybe not the very next one, but in the very near future, the testing process that we'll be doing. CHAIR: And the method that was
2 3 4	believe that those two might be connected, that that grounding would have something to do with the transmission of that energy up to the sealed area? MR. GATES:	2 3 4	 or maybe not the very next one, but in the very near future, the testing process that we'll be doing. CHAIR: And the method that was used, did that comport with the plan as
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		Page 1093	_	Page 1	095
1	different than the way that it was		1	our high pressure. But yet outby the	
2	built by the actual Bureau of Mining		2	seals where the miners in the One Left	
3	product folks that built the 2001 seal.		3	were located, they were they	
4	When they constructed the 2001 seal		4	survived the blast of the explosions.	
5	and the one that was retested in 2006,		5	So that doesn't	
6	they put mortar on all the vertical		6	that's some conflicting information of	
7	joints on the block themselves before		7	higher pressure versus lower pressures.	
8	they had actually installed them.		8	Some of the damage to the stoppings	
	CHAIR:		9	that we saw are indicative of pressures	
10	As far as you have been		10	of less than five psi in the general	
11	able to determine, either for Monte or		11	area. So there is some conflicting	
12	John, what's the highest psi that		12	information and that's part of the	
13	you've seen in an explosion up until		13	process that we're going through.	
14	this point?		14	CHAIR:	
15	MR. UROSEK:		15	Okay. Mr. Hieb?	
16	The highest pressure that		16	MR. HIEB:	
17	I've seen has been at the Blacksville		17	The State has not gotten	
18	Mine. It's a different scenario than		18	to the point of performing those	
19	we have here. It was a shaft		19	calculations yet.	
20	explosion.		20	CHAIR:	
	CHAİR:		21	Okay. The question was,	
	Right.		22	what's the highest psi in underground	
	MR. UROSEK:		23	explosions that you've seen? Is that	
	And the actual it was		24	not shaft but underground?	
25	a detonation rather than what we have		25	Underground. Yeah.	
					_
		Page 1094		Page 1	096
1	in a normal coal mine. And the		1	MR. UROSEK:	
2	pressures there reached well over a		2	I know that it has been	
3	thousand psi. But again, that's an odd		3	less than 20 psi. I think the highest	
4	situation, it was in a shaft.		4	that I can recall might have been in	
5	CHAIR:		5	the 10 to 15 range.	
6	I think the question goes		6	CHAIR:	
7	more to, in this mine, at the Sago,		7	Okay. If the lightning	
8	have you gotten any pressure psi		8	theory is proven to be correct and it	
9	measurements so far that you not		9	is proven that we had as high as 92 psi	
				1 3 1	
10	that you've concluded, not that you've		10	forces, what would be your	
10 11	that you've concluded, not that you've finished, but have you gathered any		10 11	forces, what would be your recommendation to do what would be	
11	finished, but have you gathered any		11	recommendation to do what would be	
11 12	finished, but have you gathered any numbers?		11 12	recommendation to do what would be done for all of the existing seals in	
11 12 13	finished, but have you gathered any numbers? MR. UROSEK:		11 12 13	recommendation to do what would be done for all of the existing seals in the mines in the country today? In	
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1	Page 1097	4	Page 1099
1	exactly sure at this point, how that	1	a colleague up in at Temple
2	could be done. It could be a	2	University in Philadelphia, to create
3	combination of evaluating the seals	3	the models that you see over here. It
4	themselves, evaluating the atmosphere	4	was Mr. Hieb's information that allowed
5	behind the seals, some method to	5	Mr. Wagner to put those together so
6	determine that an instance similar to	6	that they are replicas of the mine at
7	this could not happen.	7	Sago. And Mr. Wagner is gone, but I
8	CHAIR:	8	just want to publicly for the record,
9	Mr. Hieb, do you have a	9	state how pleased we are with the work
10	comment on that?	10	that he did and how much help it was
11	MR. HIEB:	11	and the help that we've received from
12	I think I might add to	12	Mr. Hieb on that.
13	that that we may need to think about	13	MR. CLAIR:
14	looking at the condition of the entry	14	Mr. Chairman, if I may?
15	heights behind the seals. We know that	15	I'd also like to recognize Chris
16	where there were areas that were	16	Weaver, who hasn't been identified yet
17	bottom mined, that the room heights	17	on the Panel, but he is responsible for
18	were about double of what the heights	18	these PowerPoints that we've been using
19	were at the seals. And there's some	19	this morning and I think they're a very
20	thought currently that perhaps the	20	effect communication tool in helping
21	concentration of those flows necking	21	all of us understand what happened. So
22	down from those high heights to the	22 23	thank you, Chris. CHAIR:
23 24	lower heights might have created a Venturi effect, which could have	23	
25	increased velocities of the blast at	25	We do recognize Mr. Weaver, and I understand he's from
23	increased velocities of the blast at	23	weaver, and i understand he's nom
	Page 1098		Page 1100
1	the seals. So I think perhaps there	1	Claremont, West Virginia
2	might be some recommendations later on	2	MR. WEAVER:
3	incorporating considerations like that	3	Yes.
4	in seal designs.	4	CHAIR:
5	CHAIR:	5	the center of the
6	Mr. Hieb, I know you're	6	universe, as I am. I think this has
7	undertaking a survey of the sealed area	7	been asked, but the testing that took
8	to determine where the heights were.	8	place at Lake Lynn, the force of the
9	Has that been completed?	9	blast was not was sent across the
10	MR. HIEB:	10	face of the seals, rather than from
11	That survey was performed	11	behind the seal?
12	by some consultants for ICG. And it's	12	MR. UROSEK:
13	in the form of two AutoCAD layers, one	13	Actually the force came
14	for the bottom surface and one for the	14	down the entry from the explosion and
15	roof surface. Yes, we are analyzing	15	the force would have hit the seals from
16	that currently.	16	the side. The seals were actually
17	CHAIR:	17	located in the crosscut.
18	And can we get a copy of	18 19	CHAIR:
110	that for the record?		And the anticipated tests
19	that for the record?		•
20	MR. HIEB:	20	will have it come from the back?
20 21	MR. HIEB: Yes.	20 21	will have it come from the back? MR. UROSEK:
20 21 22	MR. HIEB: Yes. CHAIR:	20 21 22	will have it come from the back? MR. UROSEK: The anticipated test will
20 21 22 23	MR. HIEB: Yes. CHAIR: If I might make a	20 21 22 23	will have it come from the back? MR. UROSEK: The anticipated test will have it, I guess, inside the sealed
20 21 22	MR. HIEB: Yes. CHAIR:	20 21 22	will have it come from the back? MR. UROSEK: The anticipated test will

	Page 1101		Page 1103
1	Right. Okay. What is	1	And are the seals
2	the time frame to complete the tests	2	supposed to be built in dry areas, not
3	for both MSHA and the State? And what	3	damp?
4	do your initial findings indicate	4	MR. UROSEK:
5	caused the accident? And a comment	5	Dampness really wouldn't
6	that it is very important that the	6	be a factor. They shouldn't be built
7	cause of the accident be determined by	7	in standing water.
8	the facts. I believe this is a	8	CHAIR:
9	question from Mr. Eustace Frederick.	9	Okay.
10	if you could answer that?	10	MR. BENNETT:
11	MR. UROSEK:	11	Well, the first question
12	If you're referring to	12	I'd like to ask is, you guys are
13	testing from the seals	13	investigating ICG's mistake; is that or
14	CHAIR:	14	ICG; is that right? Who's
15	Right.	15	investigating MSHA and the State? Is
16	MR. UROSEK:	16	anybody doing that, to see if they made
17	The seal testing, I wish	17	any mistakes throughout the whole
18	I could give an end date on the seal	18	process, or are you aware of anybody
19	testing, but actually each test is	19	that's looking into?
20	going to determine how much more	20	CHAIR:
21	testing we need to do, the results from	21	Maybe we could have Ed
22	each test. You know, some of the ones	22	answer that question, because these
23	we have planned is to hit them with a	23	fellows are on the investigation team
24	higher pressure to see the results,	24	and there is a mechanism for that to be
25	also to have the seals enclosed with	25	done. Maybe you could answer it.
	Page 1102		Page 1104
1	Page 1102 the seal in the main entry and the same	1	Page 1104 MR. CLAIR:
1 2	the seal in the main entry and the same	1	MR. CLAIR:
2	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And	2	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened
2	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And of course the results of those tests	-	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened and is conducting an internal review of
2	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And of course the results of those tests will determine whether we need to do	2	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened and is conducting an internal review of its own performance relative to the
2 3 4 5	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And of course the results of those tests will determine whether we need to do additional tests. As I indicated,	2 3 4	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened and is conducting an internal review of its own performance relative to the events at Sago, both at looking at the
2 3 4	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And of course the results of those tests will determine whether we need to do	2 3 4	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened and is conducting an internal review of its own performance relative to the events at Sago, both at looking at the performance of District Three prior to
2 3 4 5 6	the seal in the main entry and the same entry where the explosion occurs. And of course the results of those tests will determine whether we need to do additional tests. As I indicated, we're looking at the pressures, 20 psi	2 3 4 5 6	MR. CLAIR: Yes. MSHA has convened and is conducting an internal review of its own performance relative to the events at Sago, both at looking at the performance of District Three prior to the explosion and the systems that are
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			2 442
1	Page 1105	1	Page 1107
1	MR. BENNETT:	1	where there's methane gas, lead to an
2	So MSHA investigates MSHA	2	explosion. That wasn't the case at
3	and the State investigates the State?	3	Aracoma. We did know where the
4	Do you have a plan for quality	4	situation was and where the fire was.
5	assurance?	5	So allowing teams to go underground
6	MR. CLAIR:	6	with that knowledge is different than
7	I would just like the	7	at than at Sago, where we didn't
8	record to show that, in fact, does MSHA	8	know if there was a fire and we didn't
9	does investigate itself with people who	9	know the circumstances of what exactly
10	are not directly involved with the work	10	the explosion what happened at the
11	done by District Three. There's also	11	explosion.
12	Congressional oversight and an ongoing	12	It's been our experience
13	GAO investigation which is GAO is	13	in the past that oftentimes after an
14	the Government Accountability Office,	14	explosion, a fire does start and it's
15	which is an arm of the Congress of the	15	very difficult to detect that. At the
16	United States.	16	Jim Walters Mine, which we talked about
17	MR. BENNETT:	17	that, about the second explosion when
18	Is that your plan for	18	the rescuers go in. But what we didn't
19	quality assurance?	19	talk about that a third attempt was
20	MR. CLAIR:	20	made after that with a mine rescue team
21	Yes, that is essential to	21	go into the mine. And when they did go
22	ensuring that the agency continues to	22	into the mine, they did find a fire
23	review its efforts and improve	23	burning in a section adjacent to the
24	performance.	24	section where the explosion occurred.
25	MR. BENNETT:	25	They also found the area next to where
	Page 1106		Page 1108
1	Page 1106 Just for the record, can	1	Page 1108 the fire was had excessive
1 2	Just for the record, can	1 2	the fire was had excessive
2	Just for the record, can you tell me what changed between the	2	the fire was had excessive concentrations of methane in the
2	Just for the record, can you tell me what changed between the Sago mines and the Aracoma mines and	2	the fire was had excessive concentrations of methane in the explosive range, so it's a very
2 3 4	Just for the record, can you tell me what changed between the Sago mines and the Aracoma mines and why they didn't go in Sago, but they	2 3 4	the fire was had excessive concentrations of methane in the explosive range, so it's a very delicate situation. That information
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1	Page 1109	4	Page 1111
1	they told you what they encountered and	1	indicator of the fire. An explosion
2	you still didn't go to 57 block.	2	can I've seen numbers after an
3	MR. UROSEK:	3	explosion of anywhere from 20,000 to
4	The indication that the	4	40,000 parts per million. After an
5	five men had, again, comes back to tell	5	explosion, that's typical. When a fire
6	us that there was high levels of CO,	6	first starts, or in the early
7	there was thick, dense smoke in the	7	inception, the CO readings can be very
8	area, the ventilation current wasn't	8	low, can be five or ten parts per
9	sufficient to move that out.	9	million, and that's why we have the
10	It's difficult to tell	10	CO's monitoring system. And then of
11	with that information it's	11	course, as the fire gets bigger, that
12	impossible to tell from that	12	number gets larger.
13	information if there, indeed, was a	13	But what you're looking
14	fire burning somewhere else in the mine	14	at is initially at the Sago Mine,
15	or what the methane levels were. We	15	you're looking at the results of the CO
16	know that there was enough methane that	16	from the explosion coming through the
17	there was an explosion, so	17	fan and it's being diluted out. But
18	obviously there was methane in there.	18	you would not be able to tell if a fire
19	How much of that was consumed by the	19	was beginning until all that explosion
20	explosion, we don't know. We know that	20	gas was already diluted out. And that
21	there was also excessive methane	21	was the information that the team that
22	concentrations coming out the fan, much	22	was onsite was trying to determine.
23	higher than had normally been reported	23	MR. BENNETT:
24	at the mine. You don't really know	24	You would expect the COs
25	where that's coming from. And early on	25	to be high, or for that matter, your
	Page 1110		Page 1112
1	Page 1110	1	Page 1112
1 2	in the event, you didn't know why it	1	gasses to be high coming out of the
2	=	2	gasses to be high coming out of the returns; right?
2	in the event, you didn't know why it was there and why it wasn't going away.	2	gasses to be high coming out of the returns; right? MR. UROSEK:
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1	Page 1113 concentrations well over a thousand	1	Page 1115 MR. BENNETT:
1 2		1 2	I don't really I
3	parts per million. MR. BENNETT:	3	don't really I don't care how long it would take to
4	But as much time as it		get there, it didn't come and those men
5	took, those levels probably dropped	4 5	didn't get to hear those shots let off
6	from when you guys entered into the	6	on the surface. Do you not feel that
7	mines?	7	that would have gave them a peace of
8	MR. UROSEK:	8	mind knowing that MSHA and their
9	Well, we know when the	9	government upheld what they've told us
10	borehole went through into Two Left,	10	throughout the years.
11	that the readings were still 1,200 to	11	MR. UROSEK:
12	1,300 parts per million. So it had	12	I can't address, I mean,
13	taken quite a while for those CO	13	what it would have meant to the miners
14	readings to drop off.	14	at that at this point. I just know
15	MR. BENNETT:	15	that we were doing everything that we
16	And in my opinion,	16	could to try and get to those miners.
17	without the use of the seismograph, the	17	MR. BENNETT:
18	borehole was it wasn't there	18	But you are aware that
19	wasn't even any use to drill. I mean,	19	they was expecting that; correct?
20	why did the seismograph not even be	20	MR. UROSEK:
21	deployed? We're told that that will	21	I am now, yes.
22	happen and every one of those men	22	MR. BENNETT:
23	expects that to happen.	23	Yeah. And what would
24	MR. UROSEK:	24	that have meant to you, if you would
25	It's unfortunate that	25	have been one of them that was in
	Page 1114	_	Page 1116
1	that information is what's there. The	1	there, would you have expected to hear
2	seismic system, again, is a locating	2	that?
3	device. I think it's we've tried	3	MR. UROSEK:
4	to explain that in this case, we didn't	4	It's a very difficult
5	know where the miners were. It was	5	question to answer. But
6	really intended as part of a system	6	CHAIR:
7	that was developed in the '70s, to	7	Maybe if I could follow
8	for a situation at a mine where there	8	up on Mr. Bennett's question. I think
9	were subsequent explosions or the fire	9	what he's suggesting here is that the
10	was such that the mine rescue teams	10	use of the seismograph and the thought
11 12	could not get into the mine.	11 12	that the seismograph comes in a system
13	Mine rescue teams is the	13	is as a model, that was designed in the 1969/70 period, early '70 period,
14	most efficient, fastest way to get to someone that's trapped. If it's unsafe	13 14	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
15	or there's subsequent explosions and	15	following Farmington. So I think the suggestion
16	it's unable to get a mine rescue team	16	here, if I'm hearing correctly, is to
17	into the mine, that's what the seismic	17	say, look, we can set shots off to let
18	system was designed for. It isn't a	18	people know we're trying something that
19	rapid deploy system. It couldn't have	19	we're, you know, on the way, even if
	gotten to the mine early on that day.	20	the seismograph isn't there or is
120		21	taking time to set up. And perhaps we
20 21	It's just not designed for that It		taking time to set up. Alla perhaps we
21	It's just not designed for that. It would have taken at least 12 hours to		need to be purchasing and using newer
21 22	would have taken at least 12 hours to	22	need to be purchasing and using newer seismographs that don't take 8 or 12
21 22 23	would have taken at least 12 hours to get there and to get set up before they	22 23	seismographs that don't take 8 or 12
21 22	would have taken at least 12 hours to	22	

1			2
1	Page 1117	1	Page 1119
1	places where we can get at them.	1	assure you that's one of the things
2	Because even if it's not even if	2	that we will be evaluating as part of
3	we're not concerned about the quote,	3	this accident.
4	location so much, perhaps the answer is	4	MR. GATES:
5	to send messages back and forth to let	5	And this I would like
6	people know efforts are underway.	6	to say one thing. I think you may be
7	MR. UROSEK:	7	referring to the gas surveillance pipe
8	I think that some means	8	that went through one of the seals. In
9	that we could get messages back and	9	this particular instance, the water
10	forth would be of the utmost	10	trap that was installed was made of PVC
11	importance, because one, the rescuers	11	PVC material. I'm not sure if
12	would know the situation in the mine.	12	that's
13	And Two, the miners would know that	13	MR. BENNETT:
14	we're coming to get them and they could	14	There wasn't any metal at
15	give advice on the best way to do that. MS. HAMNER:	15	all in it or?
16		16	MR. GATES:
17	I would just like to say	17	Not in the water trap
18	that my husband's note indicated that	18	itself, no.
19	they were listening for you to give	19	MS. HAMNER:
20	them some kind of response that you	20	I'd like to make a
21 22	heard them and it didn't come.	21	comment that I've been handed from the
	MR. BENNETT:	22	one of the family members. My dad,
23	And the government was	23	Jim Bennett, in his note said, they
24	saying lack of communication, lack of communication. That was these men's	24	never heard anything from outside, it was in the note he left.
25	communication. That was these mens	25	was in the note he left.
	Page 1118		Page 1120
1	communication to you all. And	1	MR. BENNETT:
2	unfortunately, you wasn't listening.	2	You described water traps
3	Should the water traps have been	3	in the seals to prevent gas from
4	grounded in the seals?	4	leaking from inby the seals to outby
5	MR. UROSEK:	5	the seals. Have you determined whether
6	I'm sorry?	6	the water traps were actually filled
7	MR. BENNETT:	7	with water before the explosion?
8	Should the water trap	8	MR. UROSEK:
9	have been grounded in the seals?	9	My understanding at this
10	MR. UROSEK:	40	
		10	point is that they were.
11	Should have it have been	11	MR. BENNETT:
12	Should have it have been grounded?	11 12	MR. BENNETT: Are you referring that
12 13	Should have it have been grounded? MR. BENNETT:	11 12 13	MR. BENNETT: Are you referring that Randal McCloy's statement is not true,
12 13 14	Should have it have been grounded? MR. BENNETT: Yeah.	11 12 13 14	MR. BENNETT: Are you referring that Randal McCloy's statement is not true, that the rescuers didn't work?
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			2 440
1	Page 1121	1	Page 1123 encountered that. I'm not familiar
1 2	At some point, all the information that we have available will	1 2	
3	be released.	3	enough with the testing program to know if they ever have. I've never heard of
4	MR. BENNETT:	4	that though.
5	Can you tell me how you	5	MR. BENNETT:
6	can prove that they wasn't activated on	6	Are any of you?
7	their belts or before or prior to	7	MR. GATES:
8	opening the SCSRs?	8	I'm not aware of any
9	MR. UROSEK:	9	reversal. I mean, it is a chemical
10	My understanding of the	10	reaction that makes that provokes
11	testing that they did, there's an	11	the color change and I'm not aware of
12	actuator inside the SCSRs and they can	12	any reversal of that.
13	evaluate that to determine whether or	13	MR. BENNETT:
14	not it was activated. And the results	14	As far as the chemicals
15	of the testing indicate that those	15	that was used up to show how much the
16	activators were activated.	16	rescuer had been used, whether it was
17	MR. BENNETT:	17	75, 30, so on and so forth, whatever
18	But you don't know how	18	the numbers were, none of them was used
19	they can prove that, that it wasn't	19	up a hundred percent. And that should
20	activated before they actually pulled	20	tell you that I mean, that's not
21	their activation cord or?	21	- that's unacceptable. It all should
22	MR. UROSEK:	22	have been used a hundred percent. And
23	I don't know the answer	23	there was a reason that they wasn't.
24	to that specific question as to when	24	And that's NIOSH's job or your job or
25	that would have been done.	25	somebody's job to find that out.
1	Page 1122	1	Page 1124
1	MR. GATES:	1	MR. UROSEK:
2	MR. GATES: Right. I don't believe	2	MR. UROSEK: And I agree with you. I
2	MR. GATES: Right. I don't believe that the tests give any information as	2	MR. UROSEK: And I agree with you. I think that's a question in all of our
2 3 4	MR. GATES: Right. I don't believe that the tests give any information as to the actual time that they were	2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: And I agree with you. I think that's a question in all of our minds as to why they wouldn't have been
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2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. GATES: Right. I don't believe that the tests give any information as to the actual time that they were activated. MR. BENNETT: So it's a possibility	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. UROSEK: And I agree with you. I think that's a question in all of our minds as to why they wouldn't have been used fully and understand what the analysis actually means, you know, what that 70 percent means, what the 25
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. GATES: Right. I don't believe that the tests give any information as to the actual time that they were activated. MR. BENNETT: So it's a possibility they could have somehow activated on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. UROSEK: And I agree with you. I think that's a question in all of our minds as to why they wouldn't have been used fully and understand what the analysis actually means, you know, what that 70 percent means, what the 25 percent means. I think that's going to
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1	Page 1125	1	Page 1127
1 2	We could just go with the information they provide to us during	1 2	conductivity of the wire mesh but conductivity of the formation around
3	the interviews and then correlate that	3	it.
4	also with the test results that we	4	MR. BENNETT:
5	obtained.	5	So the anomaly on the
6	MR. BENNETT:	6	roof, you don't feel had anything to do
7	And again, can you	7	with the source of the ignition; is
8	provide the serial numbers and	8	that correct?
9	manufacture numbers on the SCSRs and	9	MR. HIEB:
10	the dates	10	That conclusion has not
11	the manufacturer dates? I'm sorry.	11	been made yet.
12	MR. UROSEK:	12	MR. BENNETT:
13	Yes.	13	Do you feel that it may
14	MS. HAMNER:	14	have?
15	Do you realize that some	15	MR. HIEB:
16	of the SCSRs that were manufactured	16	There's still a
17	before 1994 have been recalled?	17	possibility.
18	MR. UROSEK:	18	MR. BENNETT:
19	That's my understanding,	19	Okay. How did it get
20	yes.	20	through the seals with the wire being
21	MS. HAMNER:	21	cut?
22	Were any of the SCS	22	MR. HIEB:
23	any of the SCSRs in your possession	23	That's what we're working
24	from Sago, have they been manufactured	24	ON.
25	before 1994?	25	MR. BENNETT:
	Page 1126		Page 1128
1	Page 1126 MR. UROSEK:	1	Page 1128 And then I'm not sure
2	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so.	1 2	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the
	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so. MS. HAMNER:	-	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the screen in the belt entry and it
2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so. MS. HAMNER: You don't believe so?	2 3 4	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the screen in the belt entry and it traveled approximately, I want to say,
2 3 4 5	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so. MS. HAMNER: You don't believe so? But we do want those dates.	2 3 4 5	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the screen in the belt entry and it traveled approximately, I want to say, 25 blocks to where the anomaly on the
2 3 4 5 6	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so. MS. HAMNER: You don't believe so? But we do want those dates. MR. UROSEK:	2 3 4 5 6	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the screen in the belt entry and it traveled approximately, I want to say, 25 blocks to where the anomaly on the roof is. How did it get from the belt
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. UROSEK: I don't believe so. MS. HAMNER: You don't believe so? But we do want those dates. MR. UROSEK: Yes. MR. BENNETT:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	And then I'm not sure exactly how far it was, but you had the screen in the belt entry and it traveled approximately, I want to say, 25 blocks to where the anomaly on the roof is. How did it get from the belt entry to where the anomaly on the roof is? There isn't any screen on the top
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. 1	Page 1129	1	Page 1131
1	No. The anomaly is	1	start at the seal as soon as it went
2	really a feature in the roof that was	2	through the seal? Could the marks on
3	probably about six feet of draw slate taken in that location. The roof was	3 4	the roof have been made by prior mine activities?
4		5	MR. HIEB:
5	smooth at that spot. The anomaly is an	_	That was the immediate
6 7	imprint in the roof. We have a slide on that. Can I use your pointer?	6 7	thought when you see them, but it could
8	This double track here	8	not have been made by the equipment
9	was a feature of greatest interest.	9	that was used there. Maybe a Wilcox
10	They are two grooves that are parallel	10	miner if it was being used could
11	to each other across the entire entry	11	possibly have done that. But that is
12	on an angle, perfectly straight and	12	speculation. That's not those
13	parallel. It's just an unusual	13	marks did not appear to have been cut
14	feature. Coming in at an angle is	14	by any equipment or produced by the
15	another linear feature, it's a single	15	mining procedure.
16	track. So that's basically the feature	16	MR. BENNETT:
17	that was under investigation that's	17	Is there a possibility
18	just being referred to as the anomaly.	18	that there is any old gas wells, water
19	,	19	wells or anything of that nature?
20	MR. BENNETT:	20	MR. HIEB:
21	Okay. So you feel that	21	Yes, we've actually gone
22	it propagated how many blocks inby the	22	through all the records available to us
23	seals? Are you do you know exactly	23	for locations of active and abandoned
24	where it propagated?	24	wells. We've conducted surface
25	MR. HIEB:	25	interviews of residents to determine
1	Page 1130 Actually I have not	1	Page 1132 water wells and we've looked at all
2	really heard propagation direction	2	that information quite closely. But
3	being referred to that way. I think	_	that information quite diosery. Dut
4		3	,
. +		3 4	yet there's still a possibility that
	most of the lines of inquiry have been	4	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up
5	most of the lines of inquiry have been directed from the surface straight down		yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up in those records. And we're looking
	most of the lines of inquiry have been	4 5	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up
5 6	most of the lines of inquiry have been directed from the surface straight down to it.	4 5 6	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up in those records. And we're looking
5 6 7	most of the lines of inquiry have been directed from the surface straight down to it. MR. BENNETT:	4 5 6 7	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up in those records. And we're looking we're looking for that casing still.
5 6 7 8	most of the lines of inquiry have been directed from the surface straight down to it. MR. BENNETT: Okay. Why wouldn't it	4 5 6 7 8	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up in those records. And we're looking we're looking for that casing still. MR. BENNETT:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	most of the lines of inquiry have been directed from the surface straight down to it. MR. BENNETT: Okay. Why wouldn't it why wouldn't an ignition source have been at the seals immediately inby the seals as soon as it?	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	yet there's still a possibility that there's a casing that does not show up in those records. And we're looking we're looking for that casing still. MR. BENNETT: Okay. Did you say that the coal dust could have been a factor in the ignition?
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1	Page 1133	4	Page 1135
1	presentation as part of the evaluation	1	the plates that were damaged, or I
2	of what we will do. And again, this is	2	should say the pie pans that were
3	when it's completed and we're able to	3	damaged at the various places. And I
4	determine a final pressure that was	4	think that was part of the information
5	developed. We'll be able to take that	5	to develop try and determine where
6	information, we'll be able to look at	6	the forces were. As you know, we're
7	the amount of methane or fuel, that	7	trying to take that information and
8	fuel that was available in the area,	8	we're also installing pie pans and belt
9	and we'll be able to evaluate was there	9	hangers at the Lake Lynn Mine to
10	sufficient fuel in that, of the methane	10	determine what happens to those plates
11	that was there, to create the force	11	and the hangers when they're exposed to
12	necessary that we saw at the mine.	12	forces that we know what the pressures
13	That evaluation plus the samples that	13	are exposed against them.
14	we've been able to take to make that	14	MR. BENNETT:
15	determination if and how much coal dust	15	And the wire mesh was
16	may have been involved or played a	16	also blown down, tore up? I mean, was
17	factor.	17	it all going in one direction or?
18	MR. BENNETT:	18	MR. UROSEK:
19	And you have been in the	19	It was damaged in
20	mines; right?	20	different parts of the mine and it
21	MR. UROSEK:	21	I won't say that it was one
22	Pardon me?	22	direction, because it would be in
23	MR. BENNETT:	23	multiple directions, but the
24	You have been in the	23 24	indications are that it did in the area
25	mines?	25	
23	1111162:	25	of the seals, it did come from inby the
	Page 1134		Page 1136
1	Page 1134 MR. UROSEK:	1	Page 1136 seals to the outby direction.
1 2		1 2	_
	MR. UROSEK:		seals to the outby direction. MR. BENNETT: Another thing I'm having
2	MR. UROSEK: Yes, sir.	2	seals to the outby direction. MR. BENNETT:
2 3	MR. UROSEK: Yes, sir. MR. BENNETT:	2	seals to the outby direction. MR. BENNETT: Another thing I'm having
2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: Yes, sir. MR. BENNETT: And is it a wet mine?	2 3 4	seals to the outby direction. MR. BENNETT: Another thing I'm having a hard time with. I was at Spruce One
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	Page 1137			Page 1139
1	I'm sure that's what they're talking	1	MR. BENNETT:	
2	about, they wanted to do at that time.	2	That's a shame, isn't it?	
3	Donald modelling that	3	MR. UROSEK:	
4	By not getting that	4	Yes, it is.	
5	approved, what it meant, every miner	5	MR. BENNETT:	
6	had that SCSR on his belt and he knew	6	Yes, it is. Did you have	
7	right where it was. In this case, if	7	someone available to drill a 24-inch	
8	the miners, when the accident happened,	8	hole? If so, why was it not done	
9	they would have had to don the W-65,	9	instead of wasting time drilling a	
10	which does not contain oxygen. They	10	six-inch hole?	
11	would have had to go to some location	11	MR. UROSEK:	
12	where they would have been stored to	12	The six-inch hole was	
13	get them. I'm not sure where that	13	really put down for speed. It takes a	
14	would have been, but and I'm not	14	lot longer to put down a 24-inch hole.	
15	exactly sure where they were. But we	15	The six-inch hole, the purpose of the	
16	do know that they had them on their	16	six-inch hole was one, I think it was	
17	belt and they were able to get to them	17	explained earlier, to determine the	
18	immediately.	18	atmosphere in the area. Two, to	
19	And that is part of the	19	when the drills first went through and	
20	information as to why they could have	20	there was a silent period, if the	
21	been cachéd rather than carried. And	21	miners were in that area, they could	
22	the decision was, it's better that the	22	signal to the people on the surface	
23 24	miner has it right with him to put it	23 24	that they were there. That communication device could have been	
25	on immediately, rather than depend on the old W-65 that doesn't contain	2 4 25	put down. The television camera was,	
25	the old W-oo that doesn't contain	25	put down. The television camera was,	
	Page 1138			Page 1140
1	oxygen.	1	again, to do the same thing, to look in	
2	MR. BENNETT:	2	the area, to see the conditions,	
3	But it was a storage plan	3	possibly see the miners. Once the	
4	for the belt wearables and they	4	small hole is down there, if the miners	
5	wouldn't allow it, but now they're	5	were in that area, a number of things	
6	being stored underground.	6	could have been done, communications	,
7	MR. UROSEK:	7	air could have been put down to them,	
8	They are, in addition to	8	there's a lot of things with that. And	
9	what the miners	9	then if the mine rescue teams would no	
10	MR. BENNETT:	10	have been able to get to them, I'm sure	
11	Right.	11	a larger diameter hole would have beer	1
12	MR. UROSEK:	12	immediately started to get to them,	
13	they still have it on	13	which would have taken, anyhow, quite	a
14	their belt and there's additional ones	14	while.	
15	stored.	15	MR. BENNETT:	
16	MR. BENNETT:	16	Throughout the whole	
17	And do you not agree if	17	process, and I have lived it over and	
18	they would have had those on the	18	over again, I feel that there was not a	
19	section, they would have probably been	19	sense of urgency until you guys drilled	
20	with us today?	20	that hole and until you found out those	
21	MR. UROSEK:	21	men left that mantrip and then	
22	I think if they would	22	everything picked up from there. Can	
1 7 7	hove had additional average devices			
23	have had additional oxygen devices,	23	you do you have any explanations of	
23 24 25	have had additional oxygen devices, yes, they would have had a much greater chance of being here today.	23 24 25	that or? MR. UROSEK:	

	Page 1141		Page 1143
1	I know I was in the	1	indicated that it was over 20 psi was
2	command center and I arrived that night	2	solely based on the construction of the
3	about nine o'clock? And I know that	3	seals. And they had a limited number
4	the people in the command center were	4	of samples of it was a different
5	very cognizant that the time was very	5	type of seal than was used here at
6	precious. And I know they were doing	6	Sago. It was a cementatious foam.
7	everything they could do to get to the	7	After they went back and relooked at
8	miners as fast as they could without	8	that and revisited, they gathered
9	risking the lives of the mine rescue	9	additional information and additional
10	teams or doing something that would	10	number of samples. After they saw
11	cause ill effect to the miners if they	11	those samples, they realized that those
12	were there.	12	samples were below the compressive
13	MS. HAMNER:	13	strength that was required of those
			•
14	We have a young	14	typos of seals. So therefore, the
15	grandchild, a grandson of one of the	15	conclusion that it was over 20 psi was
16	fallen miners in the audience and he	16	in error.
17	has a heartfelt question that he'd like	17	MR. BENNETT:
18	to ask. How do you explain that you	18	It was there?
19	did not do everything in your power to	19	MR. UROSEK:
20	bring our men out?	20	It was in error, yes.
21	MR. UROSEK:	21	MR. BENNETT:
22	I could just speak for	22	It was in error?
23	the folks who were in the command	23	MR. UROSEK:
24	center when I was there, and I know	24	Yes.
25	that we did everything in our power to	25	MR. BENNETT:
	Page 1142		Page 1144
1	try to get to those miners.	1	Can you tell us how you
2		2	
	try to get to those miners.		Can you tell us how you
2	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT:	2	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old
2	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if	2	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new
2 3 4	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews, you've told us that there has been	2 3 4	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one?
2 3 4 5	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews,	2 3 4	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one? MR. UROSEK:
2 3 4 5 6	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews, you've told us that there has been explosions over 20 psi. I'm not saying	2 3 4 5 6	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one? MR. UROSEK: There are other folks on our team that would have looked at
2 3 4 5 6 7	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews, you've told us that there has been explosions over 20 psi. I'm not saying in West Virginia or the United States.	2 3 4 5 6 7	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one? MR. UROSEK: There are other folks on our team that would have looked at that, but I can just give you some
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews, you've told us that there has been explosions over 20 psi. I'm not saying in West Virginia or the United States. Is that correct? MR. UROSEK:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one? MR. UROSEK: There are other folks on our team that would have looked at that, but I can just give you some generalities. The amount of dust that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	try to get to those miners. MR. BENNETT: If I'm correct me if I'm wrong, but in our other interviews, you've told us that there has been explosions over 20 psi. I'm not saying in West Virginia or the United States. Is that correct? MR. UROSEK: There has been	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Can you tell us how you can tell the difference between an old roof fall behind the seals and a new one? MR. UROSEK: There are other folks on our team that would have looked at that, but I can just give you some generalities. The amount of dust that would have been there, obviously there
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	Page 1145	_	Page 1147	7
1	the test that we just completed in 2006	1	don't understand why you're you	1
2	indicates that the Omega block seals	2	done that in crosscuts; is that	1
3	that if they're constructed as	3	correct?	1
4	according to the way they were in 2001	4	MR. UROSEK:	1
5	and again in the 2006 tests, that they	5	Yes, that's the testing	
6	will withstand an explosion pressure of	6	method that was prescribed back in the	
7	20 psi.	7	1971 testing or information that the	
8	MR. BENNETT:	8	regulations were based on. That was	
9	Okay. Even though you	9	the method that was set up and that's	
10	know that you can drop that Omega block	10	why the testing was done as it was.	
11	on the floor and it will bust and turn	11	And that's something also that we're	
12	into dust, you feel that it's good to	12	looking into now with this latest	
13	use those?	13	program.	
14	MR. UROSEK:	14	MR. BENNETT:	
15	Our testing has shown	15	So you think that maybe	
16	that those blocks did withstand the	16	your testing needs changed?	
17	pressure of up up to 26 psi with no	17	MR. UROSEK:	
18	ill effects at all.	18	It very well may. That's	
19	MR. BENNETT:	19	something that we're looking into. And	
20	But you are aware that	20	it if it needs changed, we will change	
21	these seals failed these men; correct?	21	it.	
22	Not I'm not saying construction.	22	MR. BENNETT:	
23	I'm just saying they failed. Whether	23	In your opinion, had the	
24	it was your 20 psi rating that you guys	24	seals been built with concrete blocks	
25	required or what, they failed.	25	and all stoppings been built with	
				┨
	Page 1146		Page 1148	8
1	MR. UROSEK:	1	concrete blocks as opposed to	8
2	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And	2	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel	8
	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's	_	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and	8
2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's one of the things that we're looking	2 3 4	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and stoppings would have withstood the	8
2	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's one of the things that we're looking into. And obviously when we receive	2	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and stoppings would have withstood the explosion?	8
2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's one of the things that we're looking	2 3 4	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and stoppings would have withstood the	8
2 3 4 5	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's one of the things that we're looking into. And obviously when we receive	2 3 4	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and stoppings would have withstood the explosion? MR. UROSEK: Again, that's a pretty	88
2 3 4 5 6	MR. UROSEK: I agree they did. And they failed catastrophically. That's one of the things that we're looking into. And obviously when we receive information or conclusions that we're able to determine whatever happened, whether it be something with the	2 3 4 5 6	concrete blocks as opposed to lightweight Omega blocks, do you feel it is possible that the seals and stoppings would have withstood the explosion? MR. UROSEK:	88
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1	Page 1153	1	Page 1155
1	extremely sensitive matter and I just	1	while the rescue recovery was going in
2	am not prepared to address it. MS. HAMNER:	2	or immediately following that, those
3		3	mine records were, in fact, gathered by
4	For the record, I want to	4	MSHA. And we do have them and I
5	express my dissatisfaction that the	5	believe the ones that you were
6	hearings, the MSHA hearings, were not	6	referring to were provided yesterday,
7	open to the public and the family	7	if I'm correct. Mr. Chairman?
8	members weren't allowed to attend.	8	CHAIR:
9	From reading the transcripts, there's	9	I believe they were
10	too many I don't knows and there's	10	provided yesterday and they are being
11	enough follow-up. For instance, Johnny	11	made available.
12	Boni first, I want to ask a	12	MS. HAMNER:
13	question. Mr. Gates, did you seize the	13	Terry Helms called
14	fire boss records immediately upon	14	Johnny testifies that Terry Helms
15	getting at this Sago Mine January 2nd?	15	called out two small violations. Can
16	Were those seized? Do you have those	16	you tell us what those two small
17	in your possession right now?	17	violations were?
18	MR. GATES:	18	MR. GATES:
19	I believe the District	19	No, I can't.
20	personnel who were onsite immediately	20	MS. HAMNER:
21	on the day of January 2nd did, in fact,	21	My husband's dead.
22	take the mine records, either on that	22	There's no small violation to me. As
23	day or possibly January 3rd.	23	part of your investigation, was Terry
24	MS. HAMNER:	24	Helms' notebook found with these notes
25	When can we see those?	25	from fire bossing?
	Page 1154		Page 1156
1	Page 1154 Can we see those?	1	Page 1156 MR GATES:
1	Can we see those?	1	MR. GATES:
2	Can we see those? MR. GATES:	2	MR. GATES: I can't answer that
2	Can we see those? MR. GATES: The mine records have	2	MR. GATES: I can't answer that question right now, but I will, in
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Can we see those? MR. GATES: The mine records have been requested on some occasions and I believe a decision has been made to, in fact, release those records, so yes, you can. MS. HAMNER: Is Johnny Boni's notes that he took from Terry Helms I understand Terry Helms called out his report that morning. And Johnny took those and supposedly wrote those down in the records. Are those there? Have you read those? MR. GATES: I think some of the records were provided to you yesterday, I believe. but MS. HAMNER: I don't have them in my possession, someone might.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. GATES: I can't answer that question right now, but I will, in fact, try to get back with you, get that response to you. MS. HAMNER: Fred Jamison testified that he lost his notes, but you do have the books where he wrote down his notes that morning and you have reviewed those? MR. GATES: Again, I believe the examination, the results of the examination that you're referring to were, again, part of the information that was provided yesterday, I believe. CHAIR: Yes. MR. GATES: Yes. MS. HAMNER:

Page 1157 1 MR. GATES: 2 There were dates, times Page 1157 1 MS. HAMNER: 2 I'm confused about what	Page 1159
3 and initials on several locations on 3 you said about that. Did you	say that?
4 the Two Left section. 4 What did you feel that was on the section of the secti	
5 MS. HAMNER: 5 from?	Jacob
6 Mr. Gates, can you tell 6 MR. GATES:	
7 us when your report may be completed 7 I believe I said that on	
8 and when we can expect to receive that? 8 two occasions there have been	en samples
9 MR. GATES: 9 of the mine roof from that are	
10 Unfortunately, I can't 10 have been taken and that the	
11 give you an exact date. I think John 11 sections of the samples have	
12 had mentioned a little earlier some of 12 examined under a microscope	
the testing that's ongoing with the 13 there's been no evidence to s	
14 with the seals at the Lake Lynn 14 there was any re-crystallization	on of any
15 facility. And certainly the 15 of the rock and any that there	•
16 information that we'll gather 16 fact, fossil characteristics that	
17 gather from those tests will be crucial 17 found.	
18 to finalizing the report. I know he 18 MS. HAMNER:	
19 mentioned that the length of time to 19 Did you take those	
20 conduct all those tests, one test will 20 samples or were you given the	nose samples
21 be dependent on the results of the 21 from ICG?	
22 previous one. But I guess I'm in hopes 22 MR. GATES:	
23 that within three to four months that 23 We were I personally	
those tests would be completed and that 24 was not present, but there w	ere several
25 would give us ample time to finalize 25 of the inspection parties who	were
Page 1158	Page 1160
1 the report. 1 present when the first set of	-
2 MS. HAMNER: 2 were taken. And to the best	•
3 Do you feel that your 3 knowledge, once those samp	3
4 investigation was thorough, and what 4 collected by a consultant that	
5 could you have done to make it better? 5 retained by ICG that they we	
6 MR. GATES: 6 it was sometime after that be	
7 Well, as we've mentioned 7 received a part of that sample	
8 earlier, the investigation is still 8 subsequent to that, there has	s been
9 ongoing. And yes, I do believe it has 9 additional samples taken from	n the area
10 been thorough to date and it will 10 that, in fact, the MSHA an	d I
11 continue to be thorough as we explore 11 believe as well as the State d	id take -
12 the explore the test results, the 12 did take possession of thos	se at the
13 records and the data that we have at 13 time the samples were taken.	
14 present. 14 MS. HAMNER:	
15 MS. HAMNER: 15 This is a question for	
16 Were you the one that 16 John. You referred to the Jin	n Walters
17 testified to the roof enormity (sic) 17 Mine in Alabama. I've seen t	
18 that was found in the enormity that 18 reports with their recommend	
19 was found in the roof behind the sealed 19 changes in MSHA's laws. The	
20 area? Or was that Mr. Dean? I'm not 20 widows feel that if these char	ŭ.
21 sure. 21 been implemented by MSHA	_
22 MR. GATES: 22 would not have occurred. Ar	
23 I think we both made a 23 of this report? Have you read	d it?
24 comment about the about the anomaly 24 MR. UROSEK: 25 at one time this morning. 25 I am aware of the report	I

	D 4444			D 44/0
1	Page 1161 and I did read it, but it's been a long	1	MR. BENNETT:	Page 1163
2	time ago since I've read it. I'm not	2	You was talking about the	
3	that familiar with their conclusions.	3	communications; is that correct?	
4	MS. HAMNER:	4	MR. MCKINNEY:	
5		5	Excuse me?	
6	Were any of those you're not familiar, so you don't know	6	MR. BENNETT:	
7	if any of those recommendations were	7	The communications?	
8	implemented?	8	MR. MCKINNEY:	
9	MR. UROSEK:	9	That's what I recall	
10	I do not.	10	remembering in the report, was	
11	MS. HAMNER:	11	communication devices.	
12	And who would have been	12	MR. BENNETT:	
13	responsible for doing that?	13	Do you plan on using	
14	MR. MCKINNEY:	14	communication?	
15	I'll try to respond to	15	MR. MCKINNEY:	
16	that question. Can you hear me? The	16	Do I plan on using it?	
17	report came out, and I'm like John, I	17	MR. BENNETT:	
18	read the report sometime back when the	18	Yeah. Are they going to	
19	investigation was there. We looked	19	use them? I mean, they had the	
20	through it, and I'm going to the best	20	seismograph and didn't use it. Why	
21	of my recollection. There were	21	what's the?	
22	comments in there about the	22	MR. MCKINNEY:	
23	communication systems and things like	23	I think the question is,	
24	that and improvements in those areas.	24	is there communication out there, is	
25	Those would have taken regulatory	25	technology available that can stand	
	Page 1162			Page 1164
1	Page 1162 changes	1	explosion hazards with miners. That's	Page 1164
1 2	changes	1 2	explosion hazards with miners. That's what we're striving to look at right	Page 1164
1 2 3		1 2 3	explosion hazards with miners. That's what we're striving to look at right now. And there's been several	Page 1164
2	changes MR. BENNETT:	2	what we're striving to look at right	Page 1164
2	changes MR. BENNETT: Yeah.	2	what we're striving to look at right now. And there's been several	Page 1164
2 3 4	changes MR. BENNETT: Yeah. MR. MCKINNEY:	2 3 4	what we're striving to look at right now. And there's been several committees and two or three seminars	Page 1164
2 3 4 5 6 7	changes MR. BENNETT: Yeah. MR. MCKINNEY: to mandate those. And also there would have had to have been technology available for those.	2 3 4 5 6 7	what we're striving to look at right now. And there's been several committees and two or three seminars put together to explore that, not only the United States but what other countries may have that we're capable	Page 1164
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	changes MR. BENNETT: Yeah. MR. MCKINNEY: to mandate those. And also there would have had to have been technology available for those. And I think that's one of the things	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	what we're striving to look at right now. And there's been several committees and two or three seminars put together to explore that, not only the United States but what other countries may have that we're capable of using right now.	Page 1164
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Page 1165	D 44/7
1 MS. HAMNER: 1 going to give us any o	Page 1167
2 John, just one more 2 have any of those? D	
3 question on the Jim Waters' report from 3 you to say you weren'	
4 Alabama. Did I understand you to say 4 any of those?	t going to give us
5 that technology is delaying the 5 MR. GATES:	
6 communications aspect? 6 No, I don't believe	
7 MR. MCKINNEY: 7 that's what I said. An	nd I'm not sure
8 I don't think John 8 now, are you referring	
9 responded to that. I think I did. 9 from Mr. Helms' and N	
10 MS. HAMNER: 10 pre-shift. I'm not sure	
11 Oh, I'm sorry, Mr 11 maybe you're referring	
12 MR. MCKINNEY: 12 MS. HAMNER:	g to. Till sorry.
13 That's not a problem at 13 Did you find notes on	
14 all. We sort of had some information 14 Terry Helms?	
15 going back and forth. What I said was 15 MR. GATES:	
16 technology seems to be a challenge. 16 As I mentioned to you, I	
17 And we're having meetings now in 17 would get back to you	
18 different areas throughout the United 18 that response. I do not	
19 States to find if there are better 19 were any that were re	
20 communication systems where we can have 20 MS. HAMNER:	covered of flot.
21 a two-way communication system 21 Jamison's notes, any	
22 underground that would withstand an 22 notes from John Boni,	if you have
23 explosion and still be in existence in 23 those, we'd like those.	
24 the aftermath so we could contact 24 MR. GATES:	•
25 people who were trapped or they could 25 Okay.	
25 people with were trapped of they could 25 orday.	
Page 1166	Page 1168
1 contact us. 1 MS. HAMNER:	
2 MS. HAMNER 2 What about electrical	
3 But other countries have 3 grounding records?	
4 this communication system, this 4 MR. GATES:	
5 technology, this communication system; 5 Grounding records from	
6 is that right? 6 the company record	ds, is that?
7 MR. MCKINNEY: 7 MS. HAMNER:	
8 Well, we have people in 8 Yes. Uh-huh (yes).	
9 our Tech Support Division that are 9 MR. GATES:	
110 travaling to other countries now to 110 I'm not really sure	
10 traveling to other countries now to 10 I'm not really sure	de vou may ba
11 gather that information. And we also 11 specifically what recor	us you may be
11 gather that information. And we also 12 have some ongoing tests at a mine in 13 specifically what recor 14 referring to.	us you may be
11 gather that information. And we also 12 have some ongoing tests at a mine in 13 West Virginia where we're examining 11 specifically what recor 12 referring to. 13 CHAIR:	
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1		age 1169	1	Page 1171
1	our men from being able to walk out		1	little more information on it, maybe,
2	besides the malfunction of the SCSRs?		2	if I can figure out who this question
3	MR. UROSEK:		3	came from.
4	I think one of the things		4	MR. GATES:
5	that's going to be important to answer		5	Brian, do you have any
6	that question fully is what information		6	recollection or any knowledge of?
7	we can gain from Mr. McCloy. I mean,		7	MR. MILLS:
8	the mine rescue teams were able to get		8	I believe the only person
9	back in. There was some debris that		9	from the surveying or engineering crew
10	needed to be moved. But the debris		10	was Gary Hartsog that we interviewed.
11	wasn't such that it would totally block		11	And I don't remember him saying
12	the air courses. I'm not sure of how		12	anything to that.
13	thick the smoke may have been in the		13	MR. UROSEK:
14	area or the extent of that smoke.		14	And the company may have
15	Again, that's some information		15	information to answer that.
16	hopefully we can get from Mr. McCloy.		16	MR. BENNETT:
17	MR. BENNETT:		17	If lightning caused the
18	But 40-some hours, the		18	charge in the electric distribution
19	smoke was all cleared out and nice and		19	line, how many grounding systems failed
20	clear so you guys could see to go in.		20	between the point of initial charge
21	MR. UROSEK:		21	from lightning and the point of
22	Yeah. The particulate		22	ignition in the sealed area?
23	matter that had risen is what creates		23	MR. HIEB:
24	the smoke. The CO still was there, but		24	I'm sorry. Repeat the
25	the smoke itself had dissipated.		25	question, please.
	P	age 1170		Page 1172
1	MR. BENNETT:	age 1170	1	Page 1172 MR. BENNETT:
	MR. BENNETT:	age 1170	1 2	MR. BENNETT:
1 2 3	MR. BENNETT: Why were the surveyors	age 1170		MR. BENNETT: If lightning caused a
2	MR. BENNETT: Why were the surveyors called at 8:00 a.m. and told they would	age 1170	2	MR. BENNETT: If lightning caused a charge in the electric distribution
2	MR. BENNETT: Why were the surveyors	age 1170	2	MR. BENNETT: If lightning caused a
2 3 4	MR. BENNETT: Why were the surveyors called at 8:00 a.m. and told they would be transported by helicopter and police	age 1170	2 3 4	MR. BENNETT: If lightning caused a charge in the electric distribution line, how many grounding systems failed between the point of initial charge
2 3 4 5	MR. BENNETT: Why were the surveyors called at 8:00 a.m. and told they would be transported by helicopter and police escort and then told at 6:00 to drive	age 1170	2 3 4 5	MR. BENNETT: If lightning caused a charge in the electric distribution line, how many grounding systems failed
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		_		
	MD DEAMETT	Page 1173	_	Page 1175
1	MR. BENNETT:		1	starting at 57 block. So far I heard
2	Should they have been?		2	Jeff Toler say, why are we not starting
3	MR. HIEB:		3	at 57 block. And I have also heard
4	I'm not an electrician.		4	Dick Wilfong say, go to 57 block. I
5	I'm not the one to answer that.		5	don't feel that there's a fire. And I
6	MR. BENNETT:		6	personally know Dick Wilfong, and he is
7	Who made the decision to		7	a very knowledgeable and intelligent
8 9	start the rescue team at the portal		8 9	man. And is these days, is a man
10	instead of at the 57 block? MR. GATES:		10	not as good as his word? CHAIR:
11			11	
12	I believe that question has been asked on several of the		12	Russell, if I might, I
13	earlier panels, and that's not really		13	think yesterday, in answer to a question similar to that, it was
14	within the scope of the investigation		14	expressed by both the federal and the
15	team, per se. So I don't think we've		15	state agency that they would try to
16	got any information to add that hasn't		16	answer that. They didn't have the
17	been brought out in earlier		17	answer that. They didn't have the answer then. But I think the point is
18	discussions.		18	well taken. We need to try to get an
19	MR. BENNETT:		19	answer to that question of how that
20	Are you not investigating		20	decision was made. But we didn't have
21	these men's deaths?		21	that answer. And I think for the
22	MR. GATES:		22	record we can say we'd like to get an
23	That's correct.		23	answer to that question.
24	MR. BENNETT:		24	MR. BENNETT:
25	Well, that's part		25	Has anyone checked the
				•
		Page 1174		Page 1176
1	that should be part of the	Page 1174	1	psi that it would take to turn an Omega
2	investigation team. We need to know	Page 1174	2	psi that it would take to turn an Omega block seal into dust?
2	investigation team. We need to know that. I would like to personally know	Page 1174	2	psi that it would take to turn an Omega block seal into dust? MR. UROSEK:
2 3 4	investigation team. We need to know that. I would like to personally know that. Because they were told they	Page 1174	2 3 4	psi that it would take to turn an Omega block seal into dust? MR. UROSEK: As I indicated, that's
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2 3 4 5 6	investigation team. We need to know that. I would like to personally know that. Because they were told they could by very good men. And later I'll thank them for that. And I would like	Page 1174	2 3 4 5 6	psi that it would take to turn an Omega block seal into dust? MR. UROSEK: As I indicated, that's one of the circumstances that we're evaluating in the testing that we're
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1	Page 1177	1	Page 1179
1 2	different pressures, trying to evaluate	1 2	Well, as far as the
	the blocks as they are constructed to		failure of the seals and the SCSRs, I
3	try to get a better understanding. I	3	think if we do find when all the
4	think at the completion of the tests,	4	information is complete and we're able
5	at least I'm hopeful that we'll have a	5	to analyze it, if we do find there are
6	better understanding and we will be	6	shortcomings, I'm sure that the agency
7	able to come back and have some answers	7	will address those and improve whatever
8	for you on that. MR. BENNETT:	8	they need to do to ensure that those
9		9	items are safe.
10	There was an article that	10	MR. BENNETT:
11 12	stated that the Omega blocks, one time	11	But yet we let our men go
13	or another, failed at 17.5 psi. I was	12 13	underground and risk their lives to
14	wondering if you was aware of any time that or where that came about or	14	produce coal, which? MR. MCKINNEY:
15	that or where that came about or	15	
16	 MR. UROSEK:	16	I may be better to
17		17	respond to that than this group since
18	In the testing done in	18	they're talking about the investigation
19	the 1990s and I believe even part of	19	itself. As Brian said, we've done
20	this 2001 test, there were different configurations tried. For example, the	20	multiple inspections at the mine, electrical and complete inspections,
21	·	21	since the miners went back to work.
22	one here was the 40-inch type that's	22	We've had a lot of attention to that
23	not hitched. There are other types of		
24	Omega block seals that have been	23 24	mine. Most of you heard from Ken Tenney. Ken was there from the day the
25	approved that will withstand to 20 psi. There have been other types of Omega	25	mine went back into production. We
23	There have been other types or offiega	23	milie went back into production. We
	Page 1178		Page 1180
1	Page 1178 block seals, as well as other types of	1	Page 1180 have a volume of regulations and
2		2	have a volume of regulations and policies that we enforce to ensure
	block seals, as well as other types of seals, that have been tried that did not pass.		have a volume of regulations and policies that we enforce to ensure safety and health. There are things we
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2 3 4 5 6	block seals, as well as other types of seals, that have been tried that did not pass. MR. BENNETT: With all the violations prior to the explosion, after the	2 3 4 5 6	have a volume of regulations and policies that we enforce to ensure safety and health. There are things we test and we're looking at. Those regulations are still in place, as they were before. If the test shows
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	Page 1181		Page 1183
1	water traps were filled? What leads	1	you guys hold up ICG from submitting
2	you to believe that?	2	the plan? I mean,
3	MR. UROSEK:	3	MR. MCKINNEY:
4	If the water trap were	4	Again, I may be best to
5	not filled with water, then one would -	5	answer that. I'm going from the
6	again, I'll have to speculate, but	6	information we had yesterday. I think
7	then one would speculate that gas would	7	Davitt although they hadn't said
8	travel through the water trap. And if	8	anything, I think Davitt put those in
9	it did, then when the seals were	9	the record yesterday, didn't you all,
10	examined, they would have picked up	10	the plans,
11	whatever concentration of gas was	11	CHAIR:
12	behind the seals, in front of the	12	Yeah.
13	seals, in the general area. And that	13	MR. MCKINNEY:
14	didn't occur, from my understanding.	14	so there'd be a
15	MR. BENNETT:	15	tracking record of that? And I think
16	So do you know where the	16	that was a question we had yesterday.
17	two-tenths was coming from or	17	Exactly when did the plan start? You
18	? Could it have been through the	18	know, what was approved and what wasn't
19	water traps or?	19	approved. So that should be a part of
20	MR. UROSEK:	20	the record. And I heard Kevin
21	Well, as mentioned	21	Stricklin say very clearly yesterday
22	earlier, the seals all seals do	22	that, you know, he didn't hold anything
23	leak to some degree. It depends on the	23	up. He reviewed. He went through the
24	pressure differential across them. So	24	process to get things moving. And it
25	it's not unusual to find small	25	wouldn't have behooved any of us to try
	Page 1182		Page 1184
1	Page 1182 concentrations of methane on the fresh	1	Page 1184
1 2	concentrations of methane on the fresh	1	to put any kind of undue restrictions
2	concentrations of methane on the fresh air side of seals. So that wouldn't be	2	to put any kind of undue restrictions on those. I'm sure any review that was
2 3	concentrations of methane on the fresh air side of seals. So that wouldn't be an unusual thing. One would expect if	2	to put any kind of undue restrictions on those. I'm sure any review that was made was for safety purposes.
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1	Page 1185	1	Page 1187
1	considered best by the people who are	1	MR. GATES:
2	in the room. And then decisions are	2	You're referring to the
3	made based on a continuing basis,	3	transcripts?
4	are made in that systematic way.	4	MS. HAMNER:
5	MR. MCKINNEY:	5	No. Didn't am I
6	I don't want anyone to	6	wrong or didn't some of you talk about
7	misunderstand my answer. I wasn't	7	grounding problems?
8	making an inference that they didn't	8	MR. GATES:
9	submit plans. And I think the question	9	I think I may have
10	was, did we impede the plan approval	10	mentioned that during the course of the
11	process. So my answer is, as I	11	investigation there were some
12	understand it, no.	12	noncontributory citations that had been
13	MR. BENNETT:	13	issued for grounding issues and that
14	And who from the state	14	those have been have all, in fact,
15	was in there? If I recall, John	15	been addressed and been terminated.
16	Collins was saying, let's start at 57	16	MS. HAMNER:
17	block.	17	Can we request a list of
18	MR. MILLS:	18	these problems?
19	During the process, there	19	MR. GATES:
20	were several people from the state in	20	You certainly can, yes. A
21	there, Director Conaway, Deputy	21	list of a copy of the citations; is
22	Director C.A. Phillips, myself, John	22	that the request?
23	Collins, Robert True, Bill Takersly	23	MS. HAMNER:
24	(phonetic), Mike Rutledge, several of	24	Yes, a list of the
25	our mine rescue guys were in the room	25	problems.
	Page 1186		Page 1188
1	Page 1186 on occasion.	1	Page 1188 MR. MILLS:
1 2		1 2	
	on occasion.		MR. MILLS:
2	on occasion. MR. BENNETT:	2	MR. MILLS: And if you would, I would
2	on occasion. MR. BENNETT: On occasions. But you don't know who made that call from your department?	2	MR. MILLS: And if you would, I would make those available from the state.
2 3 4	on occasion. MR. BENNETT: On occasions. But you don't know who made that call from your	2 3 4	MR. MILLS: And if you would, I would make those available from the state. We also issued violations. If you
2 3 4 5	on occasion. MR. BENNETT: On occasions. But you don't know who made that call from your department? MR. MILLS: Who was?	2 3 4 5	MR. MILLS: And if you would, I would make those available from the state. We also issued violations. If you would request that.
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_	Page 1189	_	Page 1191
1	leave the damaged area untouched until	1	contemplating potential enforcement
2	the mine isn't it protocol to leave	2	actions to be taken.
3	the damaged area untouched until the	3	MS. HAMNER:
4	mine rescue teams access the area?	4	As a result of your
5	MR. GATES:	5	investigation, did you find any other
6	Well, I guess to address	6	violations of electrical regulations?
7	the first part of the question, I think	7	MR. GATES:
8	that we showed on one of the earlier	8	There were and I
9	animations that as some of the	9	don't recall the exact date, but there
10	gentlemen were proceeding into the mine	10	have been approximately 100, 118, I
11	in the rescue efforts, that there were,	11	believe, citations that were issued as
12	in fact, some of the damaged	12	noncontributory. A large percentage of
13	ventilation controls that were repaired	13	those did apply to electrical-related
14	with curtain.	14	issues. And those will, in fact, be
15	MS. HAMNER:	15	included in the request that you made
16	Could these changes to	16	earlier, if you'd like copies of those.
17	the ventilation system have resulted in	17	MS. HAMNER:
18	putting our miners in more harm's way?	18	If you're looking into
19	MR. UROSEK:	19	the pump and the wire mesh as an
20	One of the things that	20	ignition source, shouldn't that have
21	we'll be trying to do is to evaluate	21	been removed from the section before
22	what would have what those changes	22 23	sealing off the area? MR. HIEB:
23 24	would have impacted the ventilation	23 24	
25	system and whether or not that would have forced some of the smoke and gases	2 4 25	The suggestion MS. HAMNER:
23	have forced some of the smoke and gases	2,5	W.S. FIAWINER.
	Page 1190		Page 1192
1	Page 1190 further into Two Left.	1	Page 1192 The pump?
1 2	-	1 2	-
	further into Two Left.		The pump?
2	further into Two Left. MS. HAMNER:	2	The pump? MR. HIEB:
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2 3 4 5 6	further into Two Left. MS. HAMNER: There has been testimony that the flames reached the seals. Is there any indication as to how much heat was generated from the blast?	2 3 4 5 6	The pump? MR. HIEB: I'm sorry. MS. HAMNER: The pump? MR. HIEB:
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1 1	Page 1193	1		Page 1195
1 2	we're still in the process of evaluating that information.	1 2	state that or just Omega block? MR. UROSEK:	
3	MS. HAMNER:	3	I really don't know the	
4	Because I believe I read	4	answer to that, whether they do or do	
5	in a NIOSH report that it's not a	5	not.	
6	regulation, but they would highly	6	MR. BENNETT:	
7	recommend that a sealed-off area like	7	We would like to know	
8	that be rock dusted. How do you feel	8	that, to see if it's just Omega block	
9	about that?	9	or Why wasn't the borehole	
10	MR. UROSEK:	10	drilled at 57 or 58 block?	
11	I think what you're	11	MR. UROSEK:	
12	alluding to is the information in one	12	You mean during the	
13	of their bulletins that suggests that	13	rescue? I think that that borehole was	
14	in an area of approximately 200 feet	14	started at one point. I'm not exactly	
15	inby and outby the seals, that a heavy	15	sure. I know it was talked about. I'm	
16	application of rock dust be applied in	16	not sure if it was started. But I	
17	those areas.	17	believe the mine rescue teams were	
18	MR. GATES:	18	there before it could be completed.	
19	And I think there has	19	MR. BENNETT:	
20	been some testimony given here at the	20	What were the length of	
21	hearing that there were, in fact,	21	the bolts in the Two Left seals?	
22	applications of rock dust that had been	22	MR. GATES:	
23	made on the outby certainly on the	23	I'm not a	
24	outby side of the seals.	24	hundred-percent certain, but I'm pretty	
25	MR. BENNETT:	25	sure they were six-foot six-foot	
	Page 1194			Page 1196
1	In the seal plan it says	1	resin bolts, I think were the primary	. ago o
2	to build the seals ten feet inby the	2	means of support in that area.	
3	crosscut; is that correct?	3	MR. BENNETT:	
4	MR. UROSEK:		And achie halter is that	
		4	And cable bolts; is that	
5	Yes.	4 5	correct?	
5 6	Yes. MR. BENNETT:			
		5	correct?	
6 7 8	MR. BENNETT:	5 6	correct? MR. GATES:	
6 7 8 9	MR. BENNETT: And it also says in case you have to build a seal in the future, on the outby side of it. Can you	5 6 7 8 9	correct? MR. GATES: As far as the cable bolt requirements in the plan, I don't really recall.	
6 7 8 9 10	MR. BENNETT: And it also says in case you have to build a seal in the future, on the outby side of it. Can you explain to me, why would you want to do	5 6 7 8 9 10	correct? MR. GATES: As far as the cable bolt requirements in the plan, I don't really recall. MR. BENNETT:	
6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. BENNETT: And it also says in case you have to build a seal in the future, on the outby side of it. Can you explain to me, why would you want to do that? I mean, is that because you're	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	correct? MR. GATES: As far as the cable bolt requirements in the plan, I don't really recall. MR. BENNETT: Did you not see any when	
6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR. BENNETT: And it also says in case you have to build a seal in the future, on the outby side of it. Can you explain to me, why would you want to do that? I mean, is that because you're afraid that the seals would fail? Do	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	correct? MR. GATES: As far as the cable bolt requirements in the plan, I don't really recall. MR. BENNETT: Did you not see any when you was up there?	
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1	Page 1197	1	Page 1199
1	in. So some of them were documented	1	immediately the blast happened?
2	and existed prior to the seals being	2	MR. UROSEK:
3	installed, but there were several	3	From the information that
4	others that had occurred after that	4	we have, the blast happened the
5	time.	5	switch had already been thrown, and a
6	MR. BENNETT:	6	gentleman had just gone back into the
7	How can you use the fact	7	mantrip.
8	of soot, because isn't the explosion	8	MS. HAMNER:
9	going to scatter soot and dust?	9	If a charge had entered
10	MR. HIEB:	10	the mine's telephone line, do you have
11	Yeah. I think that's	11	any theories as to how that charge
12	part of what I was alluding to when I	12	would have gotten underground? Do you
13	said it's somewhat subjective on	13	understand the question?
14	determining the timing from some of the	14	MR. HIEB:
15	criteria. That should not be the only	15	Uh-huh (yes). That's
16	criteria used.	16	another question for, I think, a
17	MS. HAMNER:	17	trained electrical expert. So I can't
18	In your field search, did	18	really speculate.
19	you determine that the tree was hit by	19	MS. HAMNER:
20	lightning?	20	Is it possible that the
21	MR. HIEB:	21	lightning strike made the CO monitor go
22	Visually, from the	22	off by fault, since it went off line
23	appearance of the tree, that was how	23	soon after?
24	the determination was made.	24	MR. UROSEK:
25	MS. HAMNER:	25	I think that's one of the
	Page 1198		Page 1200
1	Page 1198 Visually?	1	Page 1200 things that we'll be evaluating when we
1 2	Page 1198 Visually? MR. HIEB:	1 2	Page 1200 things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the
	Visually?		things that we'll be evaluating when we
2	Visually? MR. HIEB:	2	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the
2	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually.	2	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data.
2 3 4	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually. MS. HAMNER:	2 3 4	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data. MS. HAMNER:
2 3 4 5	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually. MS. HAMNER: Were there any	2 3 4 5	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data. MS. HAMNER: Can you tell the families
2 3 4 5 6	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually. MS. HAMNER: Were there any transformers on the electrical poles	2 3 4 5 6	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data. MS. HAMNER: Can you tell the families what murdered our men? Nobody wants to
2 3 4 5 6 7	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually. MS. HAMNER: Were there any transformers on the electrical poles damaged, and did any residents around	2 3 4 5 6 7	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data. MS. HAMNER: Can you tell the families what murdered our men? Nobody wants to respond to that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Visually? MR. HIEB: Visually. MS. HAMNER: Were there any transformers on the electrical poles damaged, and did any residents around this area report loss of power?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	things that we'll be evaluating when we review the records that's on the computer, as well as the data. MS. HAMNER: Can you tell the families what murdered our men? Nobody wants to respond to that? MR. GATES:
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		5 1001		5
1	acking for the complete DowerPoint	Page 1201	1	Page 1203
1	asking for the complete PowerPoint		1	inspectors, until Mark Wilfong got on
2	presentation. Can we get that, Mr.		2	the property, then I got on the
3	Weaver?		3	property, then Doug Conaway got on the
4	MR. WEAVER:		4	property, then C.A. Phillips.
5	Yes, ma'am. We'll		5	CHAIR:
6	provide that to you.		6	Could you check the
7	MS. HAMNER:		7	verification in Keith Stricklin's
8	Can you provide the		8	report on the Omega block seals that
9	families with copies of the maps that		9	there is a reference that these seals
10	show the bending of the belt hangers		10	should be built in a complete dry area
11	and pie pans by the explosion?		11	and get back to me, John?
12	MR. HIEB:		12	MR. UROSEK:
13	Yes.		13	Yes.
14	MS. HAMNER:		14	CHAIR:
15	And I think we covered		15	This is for Richard
16	this. You will provide us with a list		16	Gates. In your opinion, how much force
17	of the grounding failures that you		17	were the seals subjected to? How much
18	identified in the electrical system?		18	force would it take to deflect the belt
19	MR. WEAVER:		19	hangers?
20	Yes. I'll provide a copy		20	MR. GATES:
21	of all the noncontributory citations		21	Again, that's something
22	that have been issued to date.		22	that we're certainly looking at as a
23	MS. HAMNER:		23	result of the testing that's going on.
24	I guess that completes		24	CHAIR:
25	our questioning.		25	And Monte, in your
	1 3			. 3
	01115	Page 1202	_	Page 1204
1	CHAIR:	Page 1202	1	opinion, how much force were the seals
2	Thank you very much. I	Page 1202	2	opinion, how much force were the seals subjected to? And what force would it
	Thank you very much. I have three quick questions. Was the	Page 1202		opinion, how much force were the seals subjected to? And what force would it take to deflect the belt hangers?
2 3 4	Thank you very much. I have three quick questions. Was the pipe the sample pipe, was that	Page 1202	2 3 4	opinion, how much force were the seals subjected to? And what force would it take to deflect the belt hangers? MR. HIEB:
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1	it was or 2	Page 1205	1	Page 1207
1	it was or? MR. UROSEK:		1	will give members of the families an
2			2	opportunity to make a closing
3	I personally didn't look		3	statement. Let me begin by reading a
4	at them, but I know that's some of the		4	statement of Chris Toler and Courtney
5	information that our team was looking		5	Browning, son and daughter of Martin
6	at.		6	Toler, Jr.
7	MR. BENNETT:		7	First, I would like to
8	And you said there was a		8	thank all those who have anything to do
9	metal pipe going through the seals?		9	with these hearings. When I was
10	MR. UROSEK:		10	growing up, I had quite a bit of
11	Yes.		11	temper. I still do. But my father
12	MR. BENNETT:		12	taught me how to harness my anger and
13	Should it have been		13	turn it into something positive.
14	grounded?		14	Since the burial of my
15	MR. UROSEK:		15	father, I have tried to piece together
16	It's my understanding		16	my life, and my family has done the
17	that it was supported with the cribs in		17	same. It has been hard to do. Each
18	the area.		18	week in the papers or the news there is
19	MR. BENNETT:		19	something else to open up the wounds.
20	Do you guys require I		20	As time moves on, I allow myself to be
21	mean, you don't require it to be		21	consumed with as time moved on, I
22	grounded or?		22	allowed myself to be consumed with
23	MR. UROSEK:		23	anger and bitterness. That ends today.
24	No.		24	My father raised me better than that.
25	MR. BENNETT:		25	We captured the hearts of
		Page 1206		Page 1208
1	Should you?	Page 1206	1	Page 1208 millions around the world. I would
	Should you? MR. UROSEK:	Page 1206		millions around the world. I would
1 2 3	MR. UROSEK:	Page 1206	1 2 3	millions around the world. I would like to thank all those who sent cards
2	MR. UROSEK: Well, I guess that's one	Page 1206	2	millions around the world. I would like to thank all those who sent cards and letters after the loss of my
2 3 4	MR. UROSEK: Well, I guess that's one of the things that we'll continue to	Page 1206	2	millions around the world. I would like to thank all those who sent cards and letters after the loss of my father. Watching these hearings, I
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	Page 1209	_	Page 1211
1	the papers. Particularly, I want to	1	Toler for recommending that they start
2	thank Mike Heims. Your visits and	2	at 57 block and for the world to know
3	calls have meant a lot to my family.	3	that if they had, there would have been
4	I have to move on.	4	one man dead and the rest would be with
5	Nothing that is discovered, no amount	5	us today. That's all I have. Well,
6	of money will bring my father back.	6	also I'd like to thank the family
7	And I know that this disaster will	7	members for standing beside their
8	forever change the coal mining industry	8	family and standing beside us and
9	for the good. I am not ignoring what	9	supporting us. And I would also like
10	went on, but I have a family who needs	10	to thank the world for their prayers
11	me. Holding onto this anger is not	11	and for everything that they've done,
12	healthy.	12	and just to let my mom know that I love
13	I remember my father as a	13	her.
14	good Christian man, a father, a friend,	14	MS. CAMPBELL:
15	husband and grandfather and a good coal	15	This is one time that I
16	miner. He died in the Sago Mine, but	16	don't have much to say. I didn't
17	that is not what he will be remembered	17	prepare anything and it hasn't come
18	for. Thank you.	18	from here. And I speak to you on
19	Now, if family members	19	behalf of my sister, Judy Bennett
20	would like to come up, we can	20	today. And I want to thank America and
21	what's that? We can put a podium up,	21	the fine people who sent cards,
22	and then the members of the family can	22	letters, donated money. We appreciate
23	come up and make a statement, those who	23	that from the bottom of our heart.
24	wish to.	24	I wish all of you could
25	MR. BENNETT:	25	have known Marty Bennett. He was a
	D 4040		D 4000
1	Page 1210	1	Page 1212
1	My name is Russell	1	hard worker. He loved his family, he
2	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I	2	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his
2	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with	2	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife.
2 3 4	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a	2 3 4	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just
2 3 4 5	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a day go by since this explosion that	2	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just as broken as it was January 2nd. Marty
2 3 4 5 6	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a day go by since this explosion that tears have not been shed from these	2 3 4 5 6	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just as broken as it was January 2nd. Marty Bennett was a member of mine rescue for
2 3 4 5 6 7	My name is Russell Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a day go by since this explosion that tears have not been shed from these eyes, but I would there's some	2 3 4 5 6 7	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just as broken as it was January 2nd. Marty Bennett was a member of mine rescue for 13 years. If he could have gotten
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a day go by since this explosion that tears have not been shed from these eyes, but I would there's some people I would like to thank and let them know how much I respect them for what they tried to do and for the efforts that they made. I would like to thank Dick Wilfong, Jeff Toler, Al Schoonover, Vern Hofer and Owie Jones for the rescue attempt that they made. And as far as I'm concerned, that's the only attempt that was made. However, I would like to thank the mine rescue teams for the attempts that they made. And at the time that they was allowed to do what they was trained to do, they done all they could do. And I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just as broken as it was January 2nd. Marty Bennett was a member of mine rescue for 13 years. If he could have gotten those men out of that mine, I know he would have brought them out. I've told Davitt McAteer from the day I met him, and I think he'll tell you this himself, today MSHA is not working. It does not work. And in my opinion, and this is just my opinion, it failed us, as FEMA failed Hurricane Katrina victims. Technology is here. We need to use it to our advantage. We have lost 12 men, and their families grieve every day. But the family that I see grieve every day is my own. And I see my sister die just a little bit every day because she
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Bennett. I am Marty Bennett's son. I need not say that I miss my dad with all my heart. And there hasn't been a day go by since this explosion that tears have not been shed from these eyes, but I would there's some people I would like to thank and let them know how much I respect them for what they tried to do and for the efforts that they made. I would like to thank Dick Wilfong, Jeff Toler, Al Schoonover, Vern Hofer and Owie Jones for the rescue attempt that they made. And as far as I'm concerned, that's the only attempt that was made. However, I would like to thank the mine rescue teams for the attempts that they made. And at the time that they was allowed to do what they was trained to do, they done all they could do. And I would like to thank them for that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	hard worker. He loved his family, he adored his son, and he cherished his wife. Our hearts today are just as broken as it was January 2nd. Marty Bennett was a member of mine rescue for 13 years. If he could have gotten those men out of that mine, I know he would have brought them out. I've told Davitt McAteer from the day I met him, and I think he'll tell you this himself, today MSHA is not working. It does not work. And in my opinion, and this is just my opinion, it failed us, as FEMA failed Hurricane Katrina victims. Technology is here. We need to use it to our advantage. We have lost 12 men, and their families grieve every day. But the family that I see grieve every day is my own. And I see my sister die just a little bit every day because she

1 And I also want to thank 2 those men who desperately tried to save 3 their lives. You won't ever, ever know 4 how much we appreciate that. And to 5 the mine rescue, I know you did what 6 you could do and what you were allowed 7 to do. And I ask Mr. Hatfield and 8 everyone at Sago Mine to please keep 9 those miners safe and to do whatever it 10 takes to ensure that no family ever 11 goes through what we've been through. Page 1213 1 answers that we need as families, I 2 hope that we can learn from this so we 3 can put more safety measures in mines 4 across America so we can try to save 5 miners if this ever happens again. We 6 don't want that to ever happen. But if 7 it does, we need to try to protect 8 these men and make sure the outcome isn't what we have to go through. 10 My uncle my aunt 11 Judy, which is Terry's sister, wanted	1215
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9 those miners safe and to do whatever it 9 isn't what we have to go through. 10 takes to ensure that no family ever 10 My uncle my aunt	- 1
10 takes to ensure that no family ever 10 My uncle my aunt	
jes in agreement to be a mought that is a selection and a sele	
12 Thank you very much. 12 me to say for her that even though his	
13 MS. HELMS: 13 body is gone, he is not really gone	
14 My name is Amber Helms, 14 because, honestly, when I lost my dad,	
and I'm Terry Helms' daughter. And 15 I didn't feel like I lost a part of my	
16 before I even start, I want to say in 16 heart. It broke, but I didn't lose it.	
17 response to Russell Bennett saying that 17 In fact, I almost feel closer to my	
18 if they would have started at 58 block 18 dad now than I did before, but only	
19 there would have only been one miner 19 because he is with me in spirit	
20 dead, that's how that one miner would 20 everywhere I go. He's not just a phone	
21 have wanted it. 21 call away. He's not just a short drive	
22 I would like to first 22 away. He's right beside me right now.	
23 thank everybody who came and testified 23 I think it's kind of ironic that I	
24 here today and came to ask questions 24 stand here and it seems like he's	
25 and support to find out what happened. 25 looking right over my shoulder; doesn't	
Page 1214 Pag	1216
1 I would like to thank Davitt for 1 it? That's because he is. And each	1210
2 putting this together and also for 2 one of these loved ones is looking over	
3 putting together the symposium that 3 every family's shoulder. And he's with	
4 happened a few weeks ago. And I would 4 us all the time. And so I hope that	
5 like to thank Governor Manchin for even 5 others can try to fill that gap in	
6 making this an option for the families. 6 their heart with the thoughts of their	
7 This hearing has 7 spirit being with you every second of	
8 uncovered some interesting information. 8 every moment of every hour of every day	
9 I feel that it has opened many windows 9 for the rest of your life.	
10 but not many doors. Seeing how much 10 Please remember my father	
11 time MSHA has been using to get to 11 and every single one of these men	
their conclusions thus far, it is hard 12 because even through death, they remain	
for me to believe that ICG did an 13 extraordinary. Once again, I just want	
14 adequate job in coming up with their 14 to thank everyone for being here. And	
15 lightning theory. But that's just my 15 I hope that we can continue to move	
16 opinion. 16 forward, find the correct answers and	
17 Although I do not agree 17 heal and save some other miners. Thank	
18 with some of the things that I've 18 you.	
19 heard, I believe that this hearing has 19 MS. COHEN:	
20 been an eye-opener and has reminded 20 My name is Peggy Ware	
21 everyone in the world that just because 21 Cohen. This is my mother, Brenda 22 this tragedy happened on January 2nd, 22 Newcomer. In closing, I would like to	
this tragedy happened on January 2nd, 22 Newcomer. In closing, I would like to that it's not over, and it needs to be 23 thank Davitt and Governor Manchin for	
24 remembered. 24 making this public hearing possible. I	
25 Along with finding our 25 don't feel all my questions were	
25 35 37.0	

1	Page 1217	4	Page 1219
1	answered, but some were. And to the	1	on the operator of the mine. Most
2	investigators from MSHA and the State	2	importantly, enforce these regulations.
3	of West Virginia, I ask that you please	3	We have to get the updated technology
4	continue your investigation and leave	4	and equipment to keep these miners
5	no stone unturned. I am not going to	5	safe.
6	let these questions go without being	6	I feel my dad was let
7	answered.	7	down by all of you. He did what he was
8	I have a lot of trouble	8	trained to do. Legislators, we ask
9	with ICG's lightning theory or	9	your help in getting these laws and
10	should I say hypothesis. I just ask	10	regulations changed. Please keep all
11	that our unanswered questions be	11	of us families in your thoughts and
12	followed up on. I, once again, want to	12	prayers and continue to keep the faces
13	express my gratitude and appreciation	13	of these 12 men in your thoughts. We
14	for the mine rescue workers. God bless	14	cannot let this go by and not make
15	you all for what you do. I thank you	15	changes. We have to prevent any other
16	for your attempts at rescuing my dad.	16	families from enduring the horrible
17	Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Dunbar,	17	pain.
18	Mr. Kitts, I would like you to look at	18	Again, thanks to Davitt
19	all 12 of these men's pictures. These	19	and Celeste for all your hard work in
20	were great men. You owe us answers and	20	supporting us through this process.
21	the truth, and we deserve the truth.	21	And once again, thanks to all the mine
22	And when you go home to your families	22	rescue workers. I appreciate
23	today, think about us not going home to	23	everything you did in getting my dad
24	our family members that were taken from	24	out of the mine. I know you did
25	us. I get to go home and continue to	25	everything you could, and thank you.
2.5	us. I get to go nome and continue to	23	ever yithing you could, and thank you.
	Page 1218		Page 1220
1	Page 1218 look at my dad's picture. I only get	1	Page 1220 And thanks to everyone around the world
	look at my dad's picture. I only get		And thanks to everyone around the world
2	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories	2	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts.
2	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any	2	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them.
2 3 4	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any new memories with him.	2 3 4	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them. MS. MERIDETH:
2 3 4 5	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any new memories with him. My sons now have to grow	2 3 4 5	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them. MS. MERIDETH: As you all know by now,
2 3 4 5 6	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any new memories with him. My sons now have to grow up without their pap-pa. My brother's	2 3 4 5 6	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them. MS. MERIDETH: As you all know by now, my name is Ann Meredith, and I am the
2 3 4 5 6 7	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any new memories with him. My sons now have to grow up without their pap-pa. My brother's daughters now have to grow up without	2 3 4 5 6 7	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them. MS. MERIDETH: As you all know by now, my name is Ann Meredith, and I am the daughter of Jim Bennett, one of the 12
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	look at my dad's picture. I only get to think about all the good memories we've had. I don't get to create any new memories with him. My sons now have to grow up without their pap-pa. My brother's daughters now have to grow up without their pap-pa. My brother and I have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	And thanks to everyone around the world for all your cards, prayers and gifts. We really appreciate them. MS. MERIDETH: As you all know by now, my name is Ann Meredith, and I am the daughter of Jim Bennett, one of the 12 that was killed in the Sago Mine
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1	Page 1221	4	Page 1223
1	from them.	1	for me and what you guys have done for
2	During this hearing I was	2	these families. And to Davitt and to
3	able to get some information, but still	3	Celeste, thank you. Thank you very
4	I don't understand the delay. I got	4	much.
5	some information about what MSHA had	5	MS. WINANS:
6	done, but haven't got the answers as to	6	My name is Pam Winans. I
7	why or what they have figured out. I	7	am the wife of Marshall Winans. My
8	still want them to continue to	8	husband worked for ten years in the
9	investigate.	9	coal mines. Marshall worked hard to
10	And as for ICG, although	10	support me and our three daughters. He
11	they told us on the day before they re-	11	loved to hunt, fish and, most
12	opened the Sago Mine, where my dad and	12	especially, proud of his camp, which he
13	these 11 other innocent, wonderful men	13	had not had such short time to
14	were killed, that lightning is what	14	enjoy. Anyone who knew Marshall knew
15	caused the disaster, but I'm still	15	that if they needed help with anything,
16	waiting on the answer to that. I don't	16	he would be there. He'd be the first
17	believe that lightning had anything to	17	in line to help. He was a father, a
18	do with it. And I ask that the state	18	son, a brother and an uncle, who most
19	and MSHA continue to look into what	19	of his nieces and nephews admired.
20	actually really did cause the	20	My family and I would
21	explosion, where these 12 men were	21	like to thank all the rescue personnel
22	killed. I'll never get the chance	22	who were there to help during this
23	again or even have the time with my	23	tragedy, from the emergency squad, fire
24	dad, Jim Bennett. There will always be	24	department, police officials, and most
25	a void in my life, my mother's life and	25	especially, to the mine rescuers who
	Page 1222		Page 1224
1	Page 1222 also in the lives of all who knew him.	1	Page 1224 risked their lives to save our loved
1 2	also in the lives of all who knew him.	1 2	risked their lives to save our loved
2	also in the lives of all who knew him. I'll always carry my dad right here in	1 2 3	risked their lives to save our loved ones. Joe Manchin and his staff,
2	also in the lives of all who knew him. I'll always carry my dad right here in my heart. But you know it's not the	2	risked their lives to save our loved ones. Joe Manchin and his staff, Reverend Day and the Sago Baptist
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			2 400
1	Page 1225	1	Page 1227
1	ask questions. We hope if there are	1	the seals, and his notes of the fire
2	other disasters in the future, that	2	bossing came up missing in the laundry.
3	other families will get to participate	3	Number eight, ICG didn't notify MSHA
4	the way we have. I would also like to	4	for two hours after the explosion,
5	thank Cecil Roberts and the UMWA for	5	despite the immediate notification
6	being a voice for Junior Hamner.	6	requirement under the Mine Act. And
7	Junior Hamner would be honored to know	7	number nine, we have been informed that
8	that Cecil Roberts and the UMWA spoke	8	four self-rescuers did not work, and I
9	on his behalf.	9	believe they did not work.
10	I am here today hoping to	10	My father did not have to
11	learn why Dad died. I am disappointed	11	die. I hope that the federal and state
12	that we didn't learn why. Six weeks	12	government will take the steps and
13	ago, ICG told us they had the answer,	13	require coal companies to operate
14	lightning. Yesterday I learned that	14	safely so that this won't happen to
15	reports were not written six weeks ago,	15	others.
16	but were written a few days ago.	16	My father, George Junior
17	Although ICG stated opinions six weeks	17	Hamner, was many things to me. Although
18	ago, their experts said yesterday that	18	mere words alone could not do him
19	their opinions were preliminary and	19	justice, I would like to speak about my
20	subject to change, and they weren't	20	father for a few minutes. I admired my
21	sure how lightning got into the mine.	21	father, for he was a man who was honest
22	The experts' reports were not	22	and enjoyed the simplicity of life. He
23	believable. They did not answer the	23	was a strong, good-hearted person who
24	questions.	24	loved people, a hard worker and a good
25	My father told my mother	25	provider, an intelligent, caring man.
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	Page 1226	4	Page 1228
1	and me that this mine was not well run.	1	He was everyone's rock. He was the
2	and me that this mine was not well run. What I have heard the last three days	2	He was everyone's rock. He was the life of the party and the civility in
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	Page 1229	_	Page 1231
1	do not yet have children. He was taken	1	offer a special thank you to you
2	away from his life in his prime, at a	2	families. I think your testimony and
3	young age on the scale of a lifetime.	3	questions, very hard questions that you
4	Why was my mother widowed at age 51,	4	were not afraid to ask, are most
5	after 32 years of marriage? And why	5	important toward this investigation.
6	will I have to explain to my future	6	And I know while you come here for
7	children their grandfather is gone?	7	answers, you come here for another
8	Why will we never lay eyes upon his	8	reason. I can see it in your hearts.
9	face again? ICG's lack of	9	You come here to assure that no other
10	consideration and its inability to be	10	coal mining family has to endure what
11	honest, that's why. Thank you.	11	you've went through. And from coal
12	DELEGATE CAPUTO:	12	miners all across this country, I thank
13	Being a coal miner, I	13	you from the bottom of my heart for
14	guess these few days has been about as	14	that.
15	emotional for me as anything I've ever	15	But I must urge you, in
16	went through in my life. And when I	16	closing, I must urge you all to stay
17	see you fine folks, I think of my	17	together because if anyone or anything
18	family and what would have happened if	18	divides you families, we will never get
19	I was in that position. And I admire	19	the answers that you so deserve. You
20	you. I just got to say from the bottom	20	may have disagreements and you may have
21	of my heart I certainly admire your	21	differences of opinion, and you have
22	courage and your braveness and your	22	every right to do that, but do not let
23	honesty. And in these last few days	23	any one thing divide you. Coal miners
24	we've talked about several things. And	24	are counting on you. May God bless
25	we've talked about the explosion and	25	each and every one of you. And thank
	Page 1230		Page 1232
1	Page 1230 why it happened and the search and	1	Page 1232
1 2	why it happened and the search and	1	you for letting me be a part of your
2	why it happened and the search and rescue efforts and the communication or	2	you for letting me be a part of your day.
2	why it happened and the search and rescue efforts and the communication or the lack thereof. But quite frankly,	2	you for letting me be a part of your day. SENATOR CARUTH:
2 3 4	why it happened and the search and rescue efforts and the communication or the lack thereof. But quite frankly, we have not gotten any answers. And I	2 3 4	you for letting me be a part of your day. SENATOR CARUTH: As a member of the
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	Page 1233		Page 1235
1	I think on behalf of	1	of this accident. And we must find out
2	myself and the Senate and this	2	what that is. I challenge the coal
3	committee, I can tell you that we will	3	mining industry that we set a goal and
4	commit we have committed to keep	4	we work a year since we're from
5	the focus and attention on anything and	5	West Virginia, that we work a whole
6	everything that could possibly make a	6	year without a fatality. And in my
7	difference and prevent this type of	7	book, that's possible.
8	tragedy in the future.	8	As I leave, I leave with
9	We do take seriously that	9	sadness, deepest condolences, deepest
10	challenge that was offered to us on the	10	sympathy for all of you. I pray for
11	first day when we first began by John	11	you. I will continue to pray that the
12	Groves, I believe, to make sure it	12	Lord will allow you proper closure.
13	doesn't happen again. And our function	13	DELEGATE HAMILTON:
14	will be to try to do all that we can to	14	Well, we've had some of
15	make sure it doesn't happen again. To	15	our questions answered, but a lot more
16	those of you in the families, I know	16	that haven't been. But one thing I've
17	these gentlemen behind us, these	17	learned in the last three days, and
18	pictures, we've been looking at them	18	that's about the miners' families. I
19	all day. And perhaps it was Amber that	19	told them in a meeting last night that
20	said that her father is looking over	20	I was at, if you want to go see some
21	her shoulder. I can assure you from	21	backbone and some grit, come down here
22	those of us who have been involved in a	22	to Wesleyan. These families are
23	lot of things in the past and that are	23	sticking together. They're asking tough
24	public type of things, the people who	23 24	questions. It's a hard thing for them
25	look over your shoulder here, your	2 4 25	to do, and they're making history.
25	look over your shoulder here, your	25	to do, and they re making history.
	Page 1234		Page 1236
1	fathers and brothers, are very proud of	1	This is the first time we've ever
2	everyone in the family who's	2	that families have ever been able to
3	contributed to this process. And it's	3	participate in an investigation.
4	not always an easy thing to do.	4	I'd like to make a remark
5	And my final remark,	5	about some of the youth in your family,
6	again, on behalf of the committee and	6	Russell Bennett, Sara Hamner Bailey,
7	the State Senate, is for the family	7	Amber Helms. You know, people make
8		_	· · ·
	members. God bless all of you.	8	comments today in this age about the
9	DELEGATE FREDERICK:	9	comments today in this age about the youth and the troubles they have, but
9 10	DELEGATE FREDERICK: I come from a coal mining	9 10	comments today in this age about the youth and the troubles they have, but I'll take these, and I'll say kids,
9 10 11	DELEGATE FREDERICK: I come from a coal mining family. I was born into a coal mining	9 10 11	comments today in this age about the youth and the troubles they have, but I'll take these, and I'll say kids, I'll take these kids any day.
9 10 11 12	DELEGATE FREDERICK: I come from a coal mining family. I was born into a coal mining family. And the Lord has allowed me to	9 10 11 12	comments today in this age about the youth and the troubles they have, but I'll take these, and I'll say kids, I'll take these kids any day. Looking back on January
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1	Page 1237	1	Page 1239 MR. HATFIELD:
1 2	know that wasn't true. They weren't listening.	2	Thank you. Ladies and
3	Junior Hamner and I were	3	gentlemen, I'm Ben Hatfield, president
4	good friends through school. We were	4	and CEO of International Coal Group.
5	lockermates from junior high and high	5	We agreed to come here this week to
6	school, I guess because Hamilton and	6	share information and answer questions
7	Hamner were always in the same	7	to help further explain what we know
8	homeroom. I don't think I ever saw in	8	and believe with respect to the Sago
9	that man's lifetime without a smile,	9	Mine accident.
10	except one time, when he found out I	10	Our understanding of this
11	was a Republican. But I'll take you	11	forum's purpose was to determine how
12	back about six months. I was walking	12	the accident happened and for all of us
13	into the Buckhannon/Upshur high school	13	to learn valuable lessons from it that
14	football game, and who was in front of	14	will help prevent such an accident from
15	me in line was Junior and his brother-	15	ever happening again. For its part,
16	in-law, Billy. And they said, you want	16	ICG has never taken the position that
17	to sit together? And I said, well,	17	the investigation into the Sago Mine
18	sure. We were watching the game and	18	accident has been finished or that we
19	halfway through that game, Junior	19	have made or that we have all the
20	started talking about the mine disaster	20	answers. Quite to the contrary, we
21	in Pennsylvania. And I don't remember	21	have tried to make it clear in all our
22	the whole conversation verbatim, but he	22	meetings with the families, with our
23	made a comment about there's things	23	employees and our statements to the
24	those miners did on the inside that	24	media that the findings we have shared
25	went against protocol and there's	25	are preliminary, and our testing
	D 4000		D 4040
1	Page 1238	1	Page 1240
1	things they did on the outside that	1	continues.
2	things they did on the outside that went against protocol, and they're	2	continues. However, we vowed in
2	things they did on the outside that went against protocol, and they're really well, his comment was,	2	continues. However, we vowed in early January that we would keep our
2 3 4	things they did on the outside that went against protocol, and they're really well, his comment was, they're damn lucky to be alive. And he	2 3 4	continues. However, we vowed in early January that we would keep our employees and the families of those who
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2 3 4 5 6	things they did on the outside that went against protocol, and they're really well, his comment was, they're damn lucky to be alive. And he went on to tell me, and this is the first I'd ever heard because my dad was	2 3 4 5 6	continues. However, we vowed in early January that we would keep our employees and the families of those who perished informed as to what we learned about the cause of the accident.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	things they did on the outside that went against protocol, and they're really well, his comment was, they're damn lucky to be alive. And he went on to tell me, and this is the first I'd ever heard because my dad was a coal miner, but it was years ago in his lifetime. He said, when you're trapped you're taught to signal. That's the code. And they're taught on the outside they're supposed to answer you. And it didn't happen And every one of these men, they believed in that code. But somewhere the system or somebody let them down. And I hope and I pray that we find an answer to this disaster. For God's sake, I hope it doesn't take 20-some years like it did at Farmington. I thank you and I appreciate you being in our and we are one family. Thank you. CHAIR: I would like to ask Ben	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	continues. However, we vowed in early January that we would keep our employees and the families of those who perished informed as to what we learned about the cause of the accident. Furthermore, we felt the moral obligation to inform our employees of what we knew and why we believed it was safe to restart the Sago Mine. Unlike the state and federal government agencies, neither the company nor its employees have the luxury of waiting a year or more for the release of formal government investigative reports. We needed to get our people back to work at their mine. ICG did exactly what they said in January that they would do. You've all heard Cecil Roberts, the president of the UMWA, and others here criticize us for announcing our initial findings in March. We make

1	Page 1241	1	Page 1243
1	Mr. Roberts' complaint that our	1	testimony yesterday indicated no such
2	announcement of initial findings is	2	recommendation during that discussion. Given the confusion and emotion and
3	unprecedented reflects on an outdated	3	
4	attitude, an expectation that we should	4	subsequent fatigue impacting those
5	do only what has been done before	5	present in that meeting, we're not sure
6	without considering that perhaps new	6	that issue will ever be resolved with
7	precedence should be established.	7	certainty. However, we do acknowledge
8	Indeed, ICG has	8	that Sago Mine management subsequently
9	voluntarily appeared before these	9	deferred to MSHA's superior experience
10	hearings that are themselves	10	in mine explosions and agreed with the
11	unprecedented in recent times. We have	11	plan to await the gas trending analysis
12	approached this task with candor and	12	before putting rescue teams into the
13	cooperation. If the government	13	mine.
14	agencies have physical evidence or	14	We believe that it is now
15	other information that contradicts our	15	more productive to focus on a
16	findings, we are anxious to receive	16	fundamental issue that needs to be
17	that input.	17	addressed. Has the current methodology
18	On a few occasions during	18	for executing a prompt mine rescue
19	this hearing we've been somewhat	19	become too slow and conservative in the
20	disappointed that the agencies have	20	aftermath of painful disasters of
21	taken a somewhat defensive posture with	21	recent years, where mine rescuers
22	respect to some important issues	22	became victims of a secondary
23	concerning the rescue efforts. One	23	explosion? In our view, this is
24	example is the discussion concerning	24	certainly an area that should be
25	the time it took to send the rescue	25	discussed further among seasoned
	Page 1242		Page 12///
1	Page 1242 teams underground and where they were	1	Page 1244 experts in mine rescue
1 2	teams underground and where they were	1	experts in mine rescue.
2	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions	2	experts in mine rescue. Despite some
2 3	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies	2	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also
2 3 4	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies would imply that the regulatory	2 3 4	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also recognize some areas where we agree
2 3 4 5	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies would imply that the regulatory authorities were not active	2	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also recognize some areas where we agree with the government agencies on what
2 3 4 5 6	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies would imply that the regulatory authorities were not active participants or the lead participants	2 3 4 5 6	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also recognize some areas where we agree with the government agencies on what happened. The explosion occurred inby
2 3 4 5 6 7	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies would imply that the regulatory authorities were not active participants or the lead participants and instead they were just waiting for	2 3 4 5 6 7	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also recognize some areas where we agree with the government agencies on what happened. The explosion occurred inby the seals. It initiated somewhere
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	teams underground and where they were to start. To listen to the questions and commentaries from the agencies would imply that the regulatory authorities were not active participants or the lead participants and instead they were just waiting for ICG to submit a plan. All of us here	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	experts in mine rescue. Despite some disagreements, I think we should also recognize some areas where we agree with the government agencies on what happened. The explosion occurred inby the seals. It initiated somewhere around spad 4010. There was no human
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	David 1045		Dev. 1247
1	Page 1245 on the surface.	1	Page 1247 required operator response is to
2	We believe that the men	2	evacuate only personnel that are inby
3	were properly trained in the use of	3	the alarming sensor, not to evacuate
4	their SCSRs. We don't know what	4	the entire mine. On the morning of
5		5	January 2nd, there were no personnel
6	happened underground or what they experienced. We only know that the	6	inby on the First Left section to
7	feedback from the NIOSH and MSHA	7	evacuate.
8	testing was that the SCSRs appeared to	8	
9	be in working order.	9	Finally, we also know with firm conviction, and I can say
10	<u> </u>	10	this from the heart, that everyone at
11	In any event, we fully agree that a longer-lasting,	11	the mine that day, from ICG officials,
12		12	
13	easy-to-wear and easy-to-use self-rescuer should be available in	13	to state and federal officials, to mine
14		14	rescue team members, were all working
	this modern era. Although it has not		tirelessly, using all resources
15	been addressed by the government	15	available, to save your family members.
16	officials in this hearing, we believe	16	We deeply regret that there was not a
17	that the hours and days before the	17 18	different outcome. We hope that our
18	explosion contained no specific		appearing here and answering the
19	warnings. The existence of small	19	questions posed to us has in some small
20	levels of methane outby the seals is	20	way helped in your search for
21	neither unusual nor unexpected and	21	understanding. Thank you.
22	would signal nothing ominous to an	22	CHAIR:
23	experienced miner. Likewise,	23	Cecil Roberts, please.
24	liberation of methane on a mining	24	MR. ROBERTS:
25	section from time to time is not	25	You have to forgive me. A
	Page 1246		Page 1248
1	Page 1246 unusual. And the Second Left crew	1	Page 1248 few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it
1 2	=	1 2	
	unusual. And the Second Left crew		few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it
2	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the	2	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I
2	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the	2	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we
2 3 4	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the accident with the same training that	2 3 4	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we love you. More important than that,
2 3 4 5	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the accident with the same training that they showed on January 2nd. They	2 3 4	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we love you. More important than that, God loves you. He can give you comfort
2 3 4 5 6	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the accident with the same training that they showed on January 2nd. They ceased operations, de-energized the	2 3 4 5 6	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we love you. More important than that, God loves you. He can give you comfort when no one else can, me or anyone else
2 3 4 5 6 7	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the accident with the same training that they showed on January 2nd. They ceased operations, de-energized the equipment and plugged the leak in a	2 3 4 5 6 7	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we love you. More important than that, God loves you. He can give you comfort when no one else can, me or anyone else that's been on this podium.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	unusual. And the Second Left crew handled that liberation event on the working section a few weeks before the accident with the same training that they showed on January 2nd. They ceased operations, de-energized the equipment and plugged the leak in a customary manner. We also believe, it is clear, that the carbon monoxide alarm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	few minutes ago, speaking to Sara, it was a difficult proposition. If I might just say to the families that we love you. More important than that, God loves you. He can give you comfort when no one else can, me or anyone else that's been on this podium. Randal McCloy's letter did tell us one very important thing. We are in a position to see our loved
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1	Page 1249	1	Page 1251
1	express to him I said, Davitt, I do	1	everything. But I do want to make a
2	appreciate how hard this is to make	2	few points, from my perspective, if I
3	work. He's got so many competing	3	might. And some of the positions I'm
4	interests coming here, and everyone	4	going to outline for you are not new
5	wants something. And I think you've	5	for us. Some of the positions I'm
6	done a good job of trying to make this	6	going to outline for you do pertain to
7	work, and I wanted to say that	7	Sago mining, but they also pertain to
8	publicly.	8	every coal mine in the United States of
9	To our members of the	9	America.
10	legislature, I said the first day they	10	I said shortly after this
11	should be commended because they moved	11	disaster that these men shouldn't be
12	very quickly on your behalf when these	12	dead right now, that these men should
13	issues were brought forward. And I	13	be sitting out here with us right now.
14	believe it was unanimous support in	14	They should be home with you right
15	both the House and the Senate. And we	15	now. They should be giving comfort to
16	shouldn't forget that the Governor	16	you right now. They should be
17	brought that legislation forward to	17	grandfathers, they should be husbands,
18	them for consideration, so he's showing	18	brothers. They're your loved ones, and
19	great leadership. And I think he's	19	they ought to be with you right now.
20	been a great comfort to these families	20	And it's a failure of the system that
21	as I've watched these events unfold	21	has given this disaster to us, and we
22	from the very beginning.	22	shouldn't lose sight of that.
23	In my position, I've	23	One of the things that
24	someone said who looks who	24	frustrated me a little bit, and I know
25	criticizes MSHA or who looks after it.	25	I went too long yesterday, but the
	Page 1250		Page 1252
1	Page 1250 There's many people here to tell you	1	Page 1252 truth is we spent a long time talking
1 2	There's many people here to tell you		truth is we spent a long time talking
1 2 3	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues	1 2 3	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've
2	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very	2	truth is we spent a long time talking
2	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues	2	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a
2 3 4 5	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very critical manner. But I do want to say	2 3 4 5	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a moment that lightning was the result
2 3 4	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very critical manner. But I do want to say it took a great deal of courage for	2 3 4	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a moment that lightning was the result or caused this disaster. I don't
2 3 4 5 6	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very critical manner. But I do want to say it took a great deal of courage for these people to come here from Arlington and try to answer questions,	2 3 4 5 6	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a moment that lightning was the result or caused this disaster. I don't believe that was the ignition. And I'm
2 3 4 5 6 7	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very critical manner. But I do want to say it took a great deal of courage for these people to come here from	2 3 4 5 6 7	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a moment that lightning was the result or caused this disaster. I don't believe that was the ignition. And I'm not going to believe that in the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	There's many people here to tell you that the UMWA is always raising issues with MSHA, and sometimes in a very critical manner. But I do want to say it took a great deal of courage for these people to come here from Arlington and try to answer questions, and I want to thank you for that. And probably tomorrow they're going to be frustrated with me again because I'm going to be raising other issues with them. But I do want them to leave here thinking that that's all I do. I do know that there are a lot of good men and women working for MSHA as federal inspectors and trying to keep the mines safe in this country. And sometimes I don't say that. To the state folks who have been here, I want to thank them for being here and being honest to the extent that sharing information with us that they know. And the truth is, as	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	truth is we spent a long time talking about lightning yesterday. And I've got a position on that, and you know what it is. I don't believe for a moment that lightning was the result or caused this disaster. I don't believe that was the ignition. And I'm not going to believe that in the morning. But understand something. Understand something. These men were alive when this explosion ended. And if you survive an explosion, you ought to be able to get out of a coal mine in the United States of America, and that's just fact. And we've fought for this before this explosion. We said this after this explosion. And we all, I believe, are united in the fact that there ought to be enough oxygen in a coal mine for survival if you're a coal miner. Give these miners the best chance possible to be alive after

	David 1050		Dama 1255
1	Page 1253 ought to be able to go and get all the	1	Page 1255 And I don't want to leave
2	oxygen that they need to live. And	2	here if I don't know if you've
3	that's not asking our government or	3	picked up on the seriousness of this
4	anybody else too much. And the	4	question about lightning being able to
5	second point, and I'm going to continue	5	hit a power line somewhere or be
6	to fight for this, and I hope we all	6	absorbed from a magnetic field somehow
7	can continue to fight for this, we need	7	as a result of a lightning strike on
8	better communications in these mines.	8	the ground, the power line picking it
9	And the truth of the matter is, at the	9	up, carrying it for a long distance,
10	mine in Illinois that ICG owns, they	10	going into a piece of equipment of some
11	have communications that they wear.	11	type, a transformer outside, traveling
12	That was testified to in Congress. We	12	two miles underground, jumping across a
13	need that on every coal miner in the	13	space of eight feet, making its way
14	United States of America. I don't care	14	past the seals. I'll submit this to
15	if the technology is not advanced far	15	you. It's one of two things here.
16	enough. Whatever distance it will take	16	Either we're going to have to close
17	us, put it on them and give them a	17	every coal mine in the United States of
18	chance to live and talk to us when	18	America every time there's a
19	they're trapped.	19	thunderstorm or this is an erroneous,
20	And the third point is,	20	ridiculous, preposterous position for
21	and we've known this since 1995, when	21	anybody to be taking. And that's what
22	Davitt was the director and he hosted	22	I think.
23	an event in Beckley, West Virginia, we	23	In closing, I want to
24	do not have enough mine rescue trained	24	all I can say to everyone here is
25	people in the United States of America.	25	that we want to be a partner in finding
			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	D 40=4		
	Page 1254	_	Page 1256
1	And the truth is, and many of you saw	1	the answers here. We want to be a
2	And the truth is, and many of you saw these people when you came to Congress,	2	the answers here. We want to be a partner in making things better for all
2	And the truth is, and many of you saw these people when you came to Congress, they looked like me because they're all	2	the answers here. We want to be a partner in making things better for all coal miners in the United States. And
2 3 4	And the truth is, and many of you saw these people when you came to Congress, they looked like me because they're all in their 50s. We have got to train the	2 3 4	the answers here. We want to be a partner in making things better for all coal miners in the United States. And I know you share that. And as we leave
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2 3 4 5 6	And the truth is, and many of you saw these people when you came to Congress, they looked like me because they're all in their 50s. We have got to train the next generation of coal miners to understand what mine rescue is all	2 3 4 5 6	the answers here. We want to be a partner in making things better for all coal miners in the United States. And I know you share that. And as we leave here, I think I've made some friends. I hope I haven't made too many enemies.
2 3 4 5 6 7	And the truth is, and many of you saw these people when you came to Congress, they looked like me because they're all in their 50s. We have got to train the next generation of coal miners to understand what mine rescue is all about.	2 3 4 5 6 7	the answers here. We want to be a partner in making things better for all coal miners in the United States. And I know you share that. And as we leave here, I think I've made some friends. I hope I haven't made too many enemies. And I'll do better. God's not through
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1	Page 1257	1	Page 1259
1	point, try and bring whatever talent I	1	I've worked for MSHA a
2	could to this.	2	long time. I've been in this industry
3	Since that time, I've	3	36 years, and I've been associated with
4	been working with many people from	4	mine rescue 33 years. It's been tough
5	MSHA, as well as the State of West	5	for me and difficult this week to
6	Virginia and Office of Miners' Health	6	listen to things said about the agency,
7	Safety & Training, and we have many	7	but I'll take those, I'll learn, I'll
8	good people. And I believe that they	8	grow, and the people I work with will
9	did their honest best. And I also	9	do the same thing because we're
10	believe that we have been honest,	10	committed. I think I've met with some
11	straightforward and open to various	11	of you individually, and I've told you
12 13	causes during the investigation of this	12	very clearly I stand responsible for
	incident, and we will continue to do	13	the things I'm responsible for. I've
14	so. And I'm not much of a politician	14	never tried to defer that to anybody
15	or much for speech making. I didn't	15	else. That's a measure of who you are
16	have prepared remarks. And like many	16	and your constitution.
17	of the families, I believe that the	17	I will tell you this very
18 19	best remarks are spoke from the heart. In the time that I've	18 19	clearly, MSHA doesn't own Sago Coal Company. MSHA doesn't contract mine
			, ,
20 21	been here, I've asked Mike Rutledge,	20 21	rescue teams for Sago Coal Company.
22	who's our mine rescue coordinator, to work with our mine rescue team and also	22	And MSHA is not responsible if Sago
23		23	Coal Company doesn't train their people to understand what to do in an
24	obtain input from any of the mine	23 24	
25	rescue team members that responded at Sago. And I believe that the state can	25	emergency. And I'm real concerned if somebody thinks that's my
25	Sago. And I believe that the state can	25	Somebody minks that's my
	Page 1258		Page 1260
1	be better prepared in future events.	1	responsibility or my agency's
2	And we have prepared and delivered to	2	responsibility, because it's not. And
3	the Governor, when he was at Wheeling	3	the things I'm saying right now are
4	at the symposium on mine safety, what	4	probably not acceptable, but I'm at the
5	we believe is at least the first step	5	point of where you stand up and you
6	in trying to improve the state's mine	6	take responsibility for things you're
7	rescue capability. And we look forward	7	responsible for and you're accountable
8	to working and making sure that that	8	for.
9	happens. Thank you.	9	Ben Hatfield made it very
10	MR. MCKINNEY:	10	clear that he thought we had superior
11	Thank you, Davitt. As	11	intelligence in a particular area.
12	most of you know, my name is Ray	12	That's exactly right. When we go into
13	McKinney. And I came down here to	13	a situation like that, we go in with a
14	represent the Mine Safety and Health	14	cooperative attitude. We're there to
15	Administration. First and foremost, I	15	do everything we possibly can. We
16	want to tell the families that I	16	don't step backwards. We step forward
17	appreciate you being here and your	17	and we try to help. I would ask that
18	patience in listening to us. As	18	everybody else does the same thing.
19	difficult as this has been, I know it's	19	There may be another one tomorrow. I
20	more difficult for you and your loss.	20	pray and hope not, but we're going to
21	And again, I want to extend my	21	be there just like we were at Sago.
22	condolences to you and your families.	22	We're going to be doing everything we
23	And my thoughts and prayers will be	23	possibly can at Sago. And when it's
24 25	with you forever. You can depend upon	24	over with, we'll still be responsible
/h	that.	25	for what we're accountable for.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	By and large, this agency does a lot of good. I've worked in the industry before we had the mine loss and I've worked in it 30-some years since. It's a much better industry. Can we do better? Yes, we can. Are we going to do better? Yes, we're going to do better. But it starts with standing up and being accountable for what you're accountable for and moving forward constantly. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. Davitt, I thank you for having us. And I think we have to look forward to what we can do in the future to make sure this never happens again, cooperatively. Thank you. CHAIR: Thank you, Ray. I just have a few people to acknowledge and	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	important the work of safety is for the companies. And I want to thank ICG for coming and appearing here. And I want to thank Cecil Roberts for coming and appearing here. We have held together this rather complicated mix because of your efforts and because of your concern for the family. These 12 fellows were, by all accounts, fine men. It is our job to see that their death is not in vain and that changes come about both in the Sago Mine and in the mines in this country and around the world that improve the chances of miners getting out and improve the chances of having safer workplaces in this country and abroad. Thank you. ********* HEARING CONCLUDED AT 3:03 P.M. *********
22 23 24 25	then a very quick remark. Justin Meredith for the Lego crosses. Thank you, Justin, so much. Miranda Elkins and Aimee Adams are the court reporters	22 23 24 25	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	back there in the back. West Virginia Wesleyan and sound people and the people that made this happen, I want to thank them very, very, very much. And we have a little team of people that we've worked with through this last four months. I'm going to ask them to stand up. Beth, Celeste, Debbie, Joe Pavlovich, Tom Bethel (phonetic), Dave "Dan" Stuart. Pat McGinley and Susan had to leave earlier. Jessie Wagner had to leave earlier. Earl Dodder (phonetic) had to leave earlier. And last but not least, Catherine Grace, my bride. Thank you, families. You've done something new here. We've tried a new thing. It seems to work. It helps out with the investigation. It will help, we think, improve the information that we're getting about this accident, about other accidents. It has helped pass the message on how important the work of the regulators are, both state and federal, how	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	CERTIFICATE I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED BY ME AND THEREAFTER REDUCED TO TYPEWRITING AND THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORDING THEREOFF. SARGENT'S COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. Miranda D. Elkins Court Reporter